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IS THE CONCEPT OF THE PERSON NECESSARY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS?
Jens David Ohlin*
The concept of the person is widely assumed to be indispensable for mak-
ing a rights claim. But a survey of the concept's appearance in legal dis-
course reveals that the concept is stretched to the breaking point. Personhood
stands at the center of debates as diverse as the legal status of embryos and
animals to the rights and responsibilities of corporations and nations. This
Note analyzes the evidence and argues that personhood is a cluster concept
with distinct components: the biological concept of the human being, the
notion of a rational agent, and unity of consciousness. This suggests that it
is the component concepts-not personhood itself-that are indispensable for
grounding our moral and legal intuitions about rights. The component con-
cepts also promote greater systematicity and coherence in legal reasoning.
The Note concludes by suggesting some implications of this view for applied
legal reasoning.
INTRODUCTION
In one of the first court cases testing the legal status of frozen em-
bryos, a Tennessee court was asked to decide the fate of a couple's frozen
embryos following an unsuccessful attempt at in vitro fertilization.' The
husband had filed for divorce and the proceedings required a resolution
to the thorny question of the status of their frozen embryos. Were the
embryos mere property to be divided up through the same judicial process
as the family house and bank accounts? Or were the embryos persons,
whose future should be decided within the same legal framework as the
custody of children? This was the one sticking point in the divorce that
required litigation.2 The dispute was animated by the couple's incompat-
ible wishes: Mary Sue Davis wanted to use the embryos for implantation
or, if that proved impossible, to donate them to another couple; her hus-
band, Junior Lewis Davis, wanted the embryos to remain frozen until he
and his wife could agree about their use, and he preferred destroying the
embryos to donating them to another couple. 3 A midlevel appellate
court held that life begins at conception and granted custody of the em-
bryos to the wife.4
The Tennessee Court of Appeals was perturbed by this result, noting
on appeal that Junior Lewis Davis would be forced to have a child and
might suffer "the psychological, if not the legal, consequences of pater-
* Ph.D. Philosophy, Columbia University 2002. J.D. Candidate 2005. Notes Editor,
Columbia Law Review, Vols. 104-105.
1. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Sept. 21, 1989).
2. Id. at *1.
3. Id. at *58-*60, *74-*75.
4. Id. at *2.
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nity against his will." 5 So the court reversed and ruled for the father,
holding that both parents had an equal and undivided interest in the
embryos, suggesting, though never explicitly saying, that the embryos
could be treated like property.6 Mary Sue Davis subsequently appealed
the case to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which reasoned that the inter-
ests of the parent not seeking procreation were paramount and the em-
bryos would have to be destroyed in accordance with the husband's
wishes.2
The outcome of the case was widely reported in the scholarly litera-
ture.8 But more than the outcome, the reasoning of the case is striking.
The Tennessee Supreme Court's decision relied heavily on a report from
The American Fertility Society which surveyed the three major positions
on the ethical status of embryos. The first position views the embryo "as a
human subject after fertilization, which requires that it be accorded the
rights of a person."9 The second view holds that "the preembryo has a
status no different from any other human tissue"' 0-in other words, mere
property. The third view walks a fine line between these extremes by de-
nying embryos "the respect accorded to actual persons" while nonethe-
less finding that the preembryo "deserves respect greater than that ac-
corded to human tissue" because of "its potential to become a person"
and "its symbolic meaning for many people.""
5. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *9 (Sept. 13, 1990).
6. Id.
7. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
8. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Rights of Embryo and Foetus in Private Law, 50
Am. J. Comp. L. 633, 637 (2002) (noting Davis court's particular concern with
constitutional fight against unwanted parenthood); Christina L. Misner, What if Mary Sue
Wanted an Abortion Instead? The Effect of Davis v. Davis on Abortion Rights, 3 Am. U. J.
Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 265, 267 (1995) (exploring discrepancy between the law's quick
recognition of man's right not to procreate and the law's reluctance, historically, to grant
the same right to women); John A. Robertson, Precommitment Strategies for Disposition
of Frozen Embryos, 50 Emory L.J. 989, 993 (2001) (discussing Davis and ultimately arguing
that refusal to enforce a contract for disposition of frozen embryos is unfair to those who
relied on contract); Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing over Embryos: Of Contracts and
Consents, 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 897, 908-09, 937-391 (2000) (suggesting procedural reform for
dispositional contracts for contested embryos); Jennifer Marigliano Dehmel, Note, To
Have or Not to Have: Whose Procreative Rights Prevail in Disputes over Dispositions of
Frozen Embryos?, 27 Conn. L. Rev. 1377, 1402 (1995) (agreeing with the Davis analysis
that priority should be given to the party wishing to avoid procreation); Daniel I.
Steinberg, Note, Divergent Conceptions: Procreational Rights and Disputes over the Fate
of Frozen Embryos, 7 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 315, 319-21 (1998) (analyzing the Davis decisions
in terms of the "right to life" approach, the "pure property" approach, and the "special
status" approach); Joshua S. Vinciguerra, Comment, Showing "Special Respect"-
Permitting the Gestation of Abandoned Preembryos, 9 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 399, 406-11,
419-21 (1999) (suggesting that states adopt specific legislation to deal with abandoned
preembyros).
9. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596 (quoting report from the American Fertility Society).
10. Id.
11. Id.
THE CONCEPT OF THE PERSON
In all three positions, the concept of the person looms large: In the
first, the embryo's status as a person makes it a legitimate subject of moral
concern; in the second, the embryo's lack of personhood justifies the
withholding of rights; and in the third, the embryo's status as a potential
person supports the intermediate conclusion. In Davis, the court was
hamstrung because the person-property dichotomy was inadequate to the
task.1 2 Indeed, the court explicitly endorsed the third view.' 3 But in
spite of these shortcomings, the concept of the person retained its central
place in the debate.
The quandary encountered by the court in Davis represents a gen-
eral problem within legal reasoning. Davis is just one example where the
concept of the person is asked to do more than simply replicate the bio-
logical concept of the human being. Personhood is a talisman that con-
fers status, respect, and moral worth, and for this reason the concept is
deeply ingrained in legal discourse in general and in human rights in
particular. 14 Rights are usually ascribed to human beings or persons be-
cause these categories are valid bearers of moral interests; indeed, this
pattern of reasoning is frequently invoked in domestic case law, the schol-
arly literature on rights,1 5 and international instruments such as the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights. 16 But these sources frequently offer
conflicting guidance on the exact content of the concept of the person or
its relationship to the idea of human beings. (Is person a broader category
than human being or merely a synonym?) Indeed, this very content is at
issue in these debates, which might suggest that finding the true defini-
tion of personhood is the key to a coherent theory of human rights. But
as the following analysis shows, the centrality of the concept of the person
in legal reasoning betrays its true argumentative role: Rather than illumi-
nating human rights claims, the concept of the person often obscures
12. The court's first priority was to decide whether or not an embryo was a person
under Tennessee law, presumably because such a determination would have some
significance. Id. at 594. Note that the dichotomy between persons and property is an
ancient distinction going back at least to Roman law, where the early classical legal theorist
Gaius divided up everything under the law into three categories: persons, things, and
actions. See G. Inst. 1.8 (Edward Poste trans., photo. reprint 1925) (4th ed. 1904).
13. 842 S.W.2d at 597.
14. The term "human rights" is used broadly in this Note, encompassing not only
international abuses such as torture, but domestic questions of constitutional rights as well.
There are two reasons for this wide interpretation. First, the scholarly literature in human
rights is increasingly making linkages between international standards and domestic cases,
so the term now has a broader application. Second, the concept of the person looms large
in the rights discourse of both the U.S. Constitution and international instruments such as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, so a comprehensive analysis of personhood
requires consideration of both legal arenas.
15. See, e.g., John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 221-22 (1980) (discussing
a person's entitlement to equal concern and respect); Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights
6-8 (1990) (discussing political and moral foundations for human rights).
16. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 2d Special Sess., Supp. No.
2, pmbl., at 72, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (referring in preamble to "dignity and worth of
the human person").
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them. This suggests that, despite appearances, the concept of the person
is unnecessary for human rights.
In Part I, this Note surveys the diverse areas of jurisprudence where
personhood takes center stage, noting that the concept plays a key role
even when its exact content is unclear. Part II explains this seemingly
contradictory evidence by suggesting that personhood is a cluster con-
cept, an umbrella that shelters diverse and conflicting intuitions. Part III
distills the evidence from the previous two Parts and presents three ways
that personhood is typically used in human rights discourse, arguing that
each is ultimately unhelpful for pursuing these claims. By exploring
these three categories of arguments, it becomes clear that the concept of
the person cannot be the foundation for a human rights claim. Finally,
Part IV offers an alternative analysis that identifies the real-but lim-
ited-contribution offered by the concept.1 7
I. THE CENTRALITY OF PERSONHOOD IN HUMAN RIGHTS
In order to understand the centrality of personhood in contempo-
rary rights claims, it is crucial to determine the function played by the
concept-i.e., how it moves the argument forward. The scholarly litera-
ture that discusses the content of this concept-what it means to be a
person and how this differs from being a human being, if it does-has
offered varied accounts, although most scholars assume that, whatever it
means, personhood is indispensable for making a human rights claim.1 8
To take just the most obvious examples, the U.S. Constitution ascribes
Fourteenth Amendment rights to persons,19 the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights makes reference to human beings,20 and the International
17. It is not within the scope of this Note to offer a complete theory of human rights,
nor is it feasible to catalog which rights should be included under this banner-a massive
task well beyond the purview of this analysis. Nor will this Note identify which entities are
the proper recipients of human rights. Furthermore, it also is impractical to offer a
comprehensive and metaphysical account of personhood. Rather, the aim of this Note is
quite modest in scope: to analyze the role played by the concept of the person in these
legal arguments, how the concept functions, and to what degree the concept is essential to
these arguments.
18. See, e.g., James J. McCartney, Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Respect for
Human Life: Philosophical and Legal Reflections, 65 Alb. L. Rev. 597, 603 (2002) (noting
many different and conflicting notions in legal literature as to what constitutes
"personhood," and attributing lack of consensus to our "age that eschews meta-physics and
asserts that much of our understanding of reality is invented, created, or is the product of
interpretation"); MargaretJane Radin, Reflections on Objectification, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev.
341, 346 (1991) (arguing that the conception of the person is problematized "[w]hen
attributes that are (or were) intrinsically part of the person come to be detached and
thought of as objects of exchange" and certain characteristics of persons become marks of
"lesser" personhood).
19. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
20. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 16, art. I, at 72 ("All human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.").
[Vol. 105:209
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights makes reference to both2k~ithout
indicating whether each term encapsulates distinct or overlapping
groups. But a more detailed analysis is in order. This Part surveys some
of the most contentious areas of human rights discourse to determine
how the notion of the person is deployed. In each area, the concept of
the person stands at the center of the legal controversy. These include
cases of partial persons (children), potential persons (fetuses and em-
bryos), past persons (brain-dead patients), almost persons (animals), irra-
tional persons (patients with multiple personality disorder), and group
persons (corporations and nation-states). While the first few cases deal
with biological questions and their legal implications, the last few trace
how the concept of the person can be uncoupled from its biological
origins.
It is important to survey these areas of the law because the term "per-
son" has varied meanings. Even within philosophy, personhood does not
have a settled meaning but is the site of intense metaphysical disagree-
ment. For example, Descartes famously conceived of persons as the
union of body and soul, and fundamentally, the union of two kinds of
substance: res extensa and res cogitans.22 This union distinguished persons
from mere animals (machines lacking souls) and from the divine (res
cogitans completely untethered from physical bodies). Locke too thought
of a person as a "thinking intelligent being,"23 and that the essential char-
acteristic of the person was consciousness, so much so that transferring a
consciousness to another human body would result in the continuation
of personal identity in another body.24 This meant that being a particu-
lar person was something quite different from being a particular human
animal. But the Lockean view has been widely rejected by a more recent
21. Compare International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,
pmbl., S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976) ("[T]he ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and
freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby
everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural
rights."), with id., pt. 3, art. 10, no. 1, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176 ("All
persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person.").
22. Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations 105-07 (F.E. Sutcliffe ed.,
Penguin Books 1968) (1641) (distinguishing between being a thinking thing and having
corporeal extension).
23. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 335 (P.H. Nidditch ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1690) (concluding also that a person "has reason and
reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and
places").
24. Id. at 340 (arguing that if the consciousness of a prince were transferred into the
body of a cobbler, the resulting combination would be the prince). Indeed, Locke also
argued that consciousness and memory were the keys to legal responsibility and divine
punishment would be handed down on that basis: "But in the great Day, wherein the
Secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no one shall be made
to answer for what he knows nothing of; but shall receive his Doom, his Conscience
accusing or excusing him." Id. at 344.
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school of thought advocating a view of personhood as a natural-kind
term. 25 Under this view, persons are simply biological organisms of suffi-
cient complexity that we can attribute psychological as well as physical
characteristics to them.2 6 Philosophers advocating a neo-Lockean posi-
tion have vigorously challenged this viewpoint by conducting a series of
deeply controversial thought experiments meant to elicit Lockean intu-
itions.2 7 But the term "person" is so contested that it is not even clear
that the word is being used in the same way by each theorist.
For that reason this Note conducts an independent inquiry into the
term. Locke provides a starting point in his suggestion that "person" is a
forensic term, "appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs
only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law .... ,,28 The meaning of the
term is so difficult to nail down because it straddles not only metaphysics,
biology, and religion, but also value theory, such as moral philosophy and
the law. Given that at least part of the function of the term is to attribute
legal predicates such as rights and responsibilities, we might analyze spe-
cific instances of this discourse in order to understand the concept's role
in legal reasoning. That is the methodology of Part I.
A. Children
Take, for example, a situation where the agency of persons is in
doubt. The uncertain legal status of children, particularly young infants,
stems from a dilemma about classification. 29 Their status as biological
human beings suggests that they are legitimate bearers of human rights,30
25. See, e.g., P.F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics 104
(1959) ("[T]he concept of a person is to be understood as the concept of a type of entity
such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing
corporeal characteristics .. .are equally applicable to an individual entity of that type.");
David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance Renewed 225-26 (2001) (arguing that identity of
persons coincides with identity of human beings).
26. See Strawson, supra note 25, at 101-03 (arguing that states of consciousness can
only be ascribed to an entity if they are ascribed to the same entity as corporeal
predicates). According to Strawson, the only concept that fills this role is the concept of a
person. Id.
27. See, e.g., Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 199-209 (1984) [hereinafter Parfit,
Reasons] (discussing hypothetical example of teletransportation); Sydney Shoemaker,
Persons and their Pasts, in Identity, Cause, and Mind 19, 19-22 (2003) (arguing for
Lockean conception of persons based on memory).
28. Locke, supra note 23, at 346.
29. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1967) (holding that children in
delinquency proceedings deserve due process protections afforded by the Constitution to
persons). As several commentators have noted, the Supreme Court paved the way for this
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), with its willingness to apply
the Fourteenth Amendment to schoolchildren. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of
Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child Relationship, 61 Alb. L. Rev.
345, 366 (1997) (describing Brown and Gault as birth of children's rights movement).
30. See H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Beginnings of Personhood: Philosophical
Considerations, PerkinsJ., Fall 1973, at 20 (analyzing rights of children in terms of degree
of personhood achieved); Tamar Schapiro, Childhood and Personhood, 45 Ariz. L. Rev.
[Vol. 105:209
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but their agency is not fully formed, suggesting that they should be de-
nied absolute freedom of choice.3 1 This produces an uneasy tension.
When formulated in legal terms, the question becomes whether children
are persons under the law.
But to what degree is the concept of the person the appropriate con-
ceptual framework within which to decide the human rights of children?
In this situation, two elements of our notion of the person stand in ten-
sion: biological human beings and rational agency. While infants are
undeniably biological human beings, infants have yet to fully actualize
either their moral or rational agency. (Indeed, if an infant is a newborn
or is mentally disabled, he or she may display less cognitive sophistication
than some fully matured animals. 32 ) Usually these elements coincide in a
fully formed human being who displays rational agency and deserves full
legal rights; this is the typical case and it is uncontroversial. But for
newborns, the components diverge in subtle but significant ways.
One might respond by noting that the concept of the person can
vary by degrees. In that sense, a child could be less of a person than an
adult-but a person nonetheless-in the same way that one object might
be taller than another. While true, it is doubtful that this resolves the
tension between the biological elements and the rational agency of the
young child-especially when we probe our intuitions about the source
of the varying degrees of personhood that we find in children. What var-
ies by degree is the rational agency of the child. Depending on his or her
age, a child may not yet have fully developed the hallmarks of rational
agency such as means-end reasoning, accepting the logical consequences
of beliefs and desires, and the transitive ordering of preferences. Such
capacities develop with time and it is these deeper properties, and their
fluctuations, that are the source of our intuition that children are persons
to some lesser degree than adults.
B. Embryos and Fetuses
Consider the concept of the person in another area of human rights:
embryos and fetuses.3 3 It is striking that personhood still frames the de-
575, 585-91 (2003) (justifying paternalism on basis of emerging personhood of children as
moral agents who are not yet fully the authors of their own actions).
31. See Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's
Perspectives and the Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11, 82-83 (1994) (noting that children are
denigrated by the law because their diminished reasoning capacity prevents them from
being recognized as full persons under the law).
32. See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals
18 (2d ed. 1990).
33. Although the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that the
U.S. Constitution does not grant any independent protection to fetuses and embryos, id. at
156-57 (noting that references to "person" or "persons" throughout U.S. Constitution only
apply postnatally), this is not to say that a state could not enact legislation to grant
protections, subject to constitutional limitations designed to protect the liberty of other
interested parties (such as pregnant women). For example, some state courts have
20051
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bate over their legal and moral status, even when the concept is poorly
equipped to handle such questions.3 4 A debate over the use of embryos
in stem cell research has raged in both the medical and legal literature,
arguing the ethical question of whether embryos have interests which
might bar their use in this research. 35 Much of this argumentation is
person-centric. 3 6 When the debate moves beyond the concept of the per-
son, it does so because the concept has little to offer and breaks down at
the margins. 37 And it breaks down at the margins for the very reason that
embryos are potential biological human beings who have not yet devel-
oped rational agency or a cognitive structure capable of supporting psy-
extended wrongful death actions for the unlawful killing of fetuses, and some states have
explicitly amended wrongful death statutes to require this reading. See, e.g., Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 600.2922a (West Supp. 2004) ("A person who commits a wrongful or
negligent act against a pregnant individual is liable for damages if the act results in a
miscarriage or stillbirth by that individual, or physical injury to or the death of the embryo
or fetus."). For a general discussion of this problem, see Dena M. Marks, Person v.
Potential: Judicial Struggles to Decide Claims Arising from the Death of an Embryo or
Fetus and Michigan's Struggle to Settle the Question, 37 Akron L. Rev. 41 (2004).
34. For a probing analysis of in vitro embryos and the concept of the person, see
Kathleen V. Wilkes, Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments 69-72
(1988) (arguing that implanted embryos "require[ ] the full application of the stance that
we take to persons, ascribing to it interests as demanding as those of any fully-fledged
persons" but that an embryo not in a position to develop has no such claims on us).
35. See, e.g., Ronald M. Green, The Human Embryo Research Debates 133-63 (2001)
(exploring recent developments in stem cell debate); Kayhan Parsi, Metaphorical
Imagination: The Moral and Legal Status of Fetuses and Embryos, 2 DePaulJ. Health Care
L. 703, 704 (1999) ("Moral and legal status often encompasses issues of personhood,
interests, and suffering. Is the fetus a person? Is the embryo a piece of property? Does a
fetus have interests?").
36. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995)
(unpublished decision) (placing concept of the embryo somewhere between categories of
persons and property in concluding that their potential for human life entitles them to
some minimal rights), rev'd on other grounds, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997); Davis v.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596 (Tenn. 1992) (noting that the three major ethical positions
over legal status of embryos assign or deny rights on basis of a continuum with full
personhood at one end and mere human tissue at the other). The concept of the person
still frames the debate in Kass-the implicit assumption of the trial court seems to be that
full human rights go with personhood and that entities in between persons and property
should be afforded some-though not all-human rights. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2
(stating that "[t]he fact that zygotes are not persons from a legal standpoint does not
establish they are property within the ordinary sense of that term," noting that "they
represent the ultimate in nascency and potentiality," and calling any equation between
them and "washing machines and jewelry for purposes of a marital distribution . . .
absurd").
37. See Karen Lebacqz, On the Elusive Nature of Respect, in The Human Embryonic
Stem Cell Debate 149, 160 (Suzanne Holland et al. eds., 2001) (concluding that an embryo
should be respected as an entity with value even if it falls short of full personhood,
although maintaining that embryonic research is consistent with this respect); John A.
Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New
Reproduction, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 942, 971-76 (1986) (arguing that preimplantation
embryos should not be afforded same rights as full biological persons, but may deserve
greater respect than mere human tissue because of our respect for human life).
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chological properties. Once again, there is a tension between competing
interpretations of personhood.
A similar phenomenon exists in the abortion debate. Arguing
whether a fetus is a person puts pressure on the legal concept. Roe v.
Wade framed the issue in terms of whether a fetus was a person under the
U.S. Constitution, 38 although the Court declined to passjudgment on the
metaphysical status of the fetus. 39 However, fetuses are frequently re-
ferred to as "persons" for purposes of wrongful death in tort law.40 The
need to hang onto the concept of the person can be so strong that the
jurisprudence does so even on pain of contradiction. 41
The person-centric nature of the abortion debate can be explained,
in part, by the language of personhood in the Fourteenth Amendment,
which establishes the legal concepts required for anyone making an equal
protection claim.4 2 In other words, the nature of constitutional interpre-
tation requires that litigants frame their arguments to fit the language of
a constitutional provision, even when that language is unsuitable. But
there are two points to be made here. First, it is striking that the concept
of the person looms large in ethical debates about the status of the fetus
38. See Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion 109-10 (Vintage Books 1994) [hereinafter
Dworkin, Life's Dominion]. Dworkin notes that the status of a fetus as a person cannot be
a matter for the states to decide because that would beg the question against recognizing
constitutional protection for fetuses under the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the
Fourteenth Amendment demands equal treatment for persons in all fifty states, the matter
could only be left to states if it were decided, from the beginning, that fetuses were not
persons for federal constitutional law. Id.
39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) ("We need not resolve the difficult
question of when life begins.").
40. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 33, at 53-70 (surveying states that consider fetuses
persons for purposes of wrongful death statutes); Brenda Daugherty Snow, Note, Torts-
Wrongful Death: A Viable Fetus is Not a "Person" Under the Arkansas Wrongful Death
Statute, 19 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 307, 308 (1997). However, when the House of
Representatives attempted to make violence against a fetus a separate crime from violence
against the mother, they did so with the language of "human being" and by including the
fetus within the category of Homo sapiens. See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2001,
H.R. 503, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001); see also Tara Kole & Laura Kadetsky, Recent
Developments, The Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 39 Harv.J. on Legis. 215, 215 (2002)
(discussing Act in comparison to Roe's assessment of fetal life). For a discussion of these
issues as they were treated before Roe, see Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The
Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 Notre Dame Law. 349, 358-59 (1971) (tracing
historical evolution of wrongful death actions for fetuses and stillborn infants and their
status as "persons" in tort law).
41. See Jost, supra note 8, at 633 (noting that "states tend not to deal with the
question of personhood or legal capacity of the unborn comprehensively, but rather
address the issue on a case by case and issue by issue basis").
42. See Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 38, at 22-23 ("The question is
therefore inescapable whether a fetus is a person for the purposes of that clause-whether
a fetus is a constitutional person."); Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L.
Rev. 653, 674 (2000) (tracing legal implications of decision by the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply the Equal Protection Clause to the category of all
persons).
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and the embryo, even when issues of constitutional interpretation are
largely absent.4 3 This suggests that the centrality of the concept of the
person in these debates is not wholly attributable to the constitutional
language. Second, the fact that the Constitution requires litigants to in-
voke the language of personhood suggests that the term is not meant to
begin an argument, but rather to signal the conclusion of the argument. In
other words, personhood would not, by itself, constitute a reason for
granting rights. The term "person" might be applied not as ajustification
for the ascription of rights but rather to signal that we have, for other
reasons, granted rights to the fetus and wish to signal this fact through
conferral of personhood. 44 But if the concept of the person is deployed
as a mere placeholder for a conclusion, it cannot simultaneously serve as
a reason for granting rights, on pain of circularity.
C. Brain-Dead Patients
This brief survey demonstrates the centrality of the concept of the
person to human rights discourse but suggests that the various elements
associated with personhood do not necessarily cling together. Indeed,
the most contentious cases in law and morality are precisely those where
interpretations conflict. Consider the once-thorny issue of organ dona-
tion. 4 5 In order for organs to be viable for transplantation, they must be
harvested while the patient's heart and lungs continue to function and
provide oxygen to the body. However, organ donation of critical organs
is only ethically permissible if the patient is already dead.4 6 We ask our-
selves: Is this patient still a person?4 7 The answer, of course, depends on
the essential elements of personhood. If the essential element of per-
sonhood is cognition, then the patient is dead, and no rights are violated.
If the essential element is biological functioning, 48 such as a beating
heart, then the patient is arguably not dead, and organ harvesting might
violate his rights.
43. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
44. See infra Part III.C.
45. See Robert M. Veatch, Transplantation Ethics 43-47 (2000) (discussing role of
brain death in transplant ethics); Brian Kibble-Smith, Note and Comment, Can Good
Medicine Be Bad Law?, 61 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 151, 164 (1985) (arguing that adoption of
brain-death standard will increase conflict in the law rather than reduce it).
46. See Ronald Munson, Raising the Dead: Organ Transplants, Ethics, and Society
185 (2002) (discussing the "Dead-Donor Rule").
47. See David Lamb, Death, Brain Death and Ethics 83-94 (1985) (discussing concept
of the person in relation to brain death); Erik S. Jaffe, Note, "She's Got Bette Davis['s]
Eyes": Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and
Due Process Clauses, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 528, 553-54 (1990) ("When a person has
irreversible termination of brain function, that person is legally dead-the 'person' no
longer exists. The law thus views the primary defining characteristic of a person as the
capacity (or at least the possibility, however remote) for mentation.").
48. Jaffe, supra note 47, at 554 n.125 (pointing out that some consider "capacity to
maintain integrated biological functioning" the appropriate standard for personhood).
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The medical community ultimately solved this philosophical conun-
drum by inventing brain death, a neuro-state typically measured by a neu-
rologist administering, among other things, an apnea test.49 Brain death
resolves the paradox that arises when a patient is dead even though her
body continues to function biologically.5 0 This theoretical rubric has
been codified in state law5' and state courts have also adopted the defini-
tion.52 This solved the ethical quandary faced by the medical community:
Doctors would only harvest organs from patients who were biologically
alive but who were no longer persons under the law because they were
brain dead.5 3
The brain-death category prompts uneasiness for the very reason
that it brings two interpretations of what it means to be a person directly
into conflict. A biological animal continues to function (at some minimal
level), but there is no evidence of higher cognitive functioning, no evi-
dence of consciousness, and no evidence of rational agency at all. 54 If we
insist on analyzing the question as one of personhood, an answer is not
forthcoming.5 5 But theorists tenaciously seek an answer because they as-
49. The apnea test determines whether the brain can identify an absence of oxygen in
the blood and send a signal to the lungs to breathe. See Fred Plum, Clinical Standards and
Technological Confirmatory Tests in Diagnosing Brain Death, in The Definition of Death
34, 41 (StuartJ. Youngner et al. eds., 1999) ("[T]he apneic test represents the ultimate
physiological-clinical test to diagnose brain death.").
50. See Munson, supra note 46, at 85-86.
51. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See In re Haymer, 450
N.E.2d 940, 943 n.2-4 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
52. For example, the New York State Court of Appeals has sanctioned the "brain
death" theory in rejecting appeals by convicted murderers who argued that their victims
were legally killed by doctors harvesting organs for transplant. New York v. Eulo, 472
N.E.2d 286, 290, 295 (N.Y. 1984). In rejecting the defendants' claims, the Court expressed
the issue in terms of personhood, noting that in "the immediate context, pertinent here,
determination of a person's 'death' is relevant because our Penal Law defines homicide in
terms of 'conduct which causes the death of a person."' Id. at 349.
53. The acceptance of the solution by medical practitioners was not completely
mirrored by the scholarly literature in law and ethics, where it is still debated. See, e.g.,
Munson, supra note 46, at 180-82 (noting that the brain-death definition is "fraught with
problems"); David Randolph Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 Cornell L.
Rev. 850, 860 (1986) ("Biological existence following neocortical death raises several
problems for law and medicine."); Josef Seifert, Is "Brain Death" Actually Death?, in
Working Group on the Determination of Brain Death and Its Relationship to Human
Death 95, 139 (R.J. White et al. eds., 1992) (rejecting the medical definition of brain death
on religious, theological, and philosophical grounds); cf. Alexander Morgan Capron, The
Bifurcated Legal Standard for Determining Death: Does it Work?, in The Definition of
Death, supra note 49, at 117, 129-30 (arguing that legal definition of death has problems
but has produced a workable consensus).
54. See Veatch, supra note 45, at 208-09 (noting that doctors and nurses may find
organ procurement from a still-warm body "deeply troubl[ing]").
55. See, e.g., Margaret Lock, Twice Dead: Organ Transplants and the Reinvention of
Death 235 (2002) (asking what happens "[w]hen [b]odies [o]utlive [plersons"). Lock
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sume the answer will be legally and morally relevant for determining the
rights of those involved. 56 In fact, we consider it the central job of the law
to resolve such questions because the stakes are so high.5 7
D. Animals as Nonhuman Persons
As a next example, consider the role played by the concept of the
person in the animal rights movement. The status of animals-particu-
larly sophisticated primates-remains deeply controversial in law and phi-
losophy,58 although their cause has not yet been adopted under the ban-
ner of human rights in American law schools. However, the relevant
aspect for the present argument is not the acceptance or denial of the
animal rights worldview, but the concepts marshaled during these de-
bates. Several theorists have suggested that some animals meet most cri-
teria for personhood and are therefore deserving of basic human
rights. 5 9 As with embryos, part of the problem stems from the law's reli-
ance on the mutually exclusive concepts of persons and property-
neither of which are entirely satisfactory for dealing with animals.60
notes that "[t]he physical demise of individuals and their social death do not always
coincide closely. Although social and personal death and their memorialization usually
take place after physical death, under certain circumstances the situation is reversed." Id.
at 119.
56. See Veatch, supra note 45, at 45 (noting that all definitions of death attempt to
"determine that which is so significant to a human being that its loss constitutes the change
in the moral and legal status of the individual").
57. For a discussion of the human rights implications of informed consent abuses
across the world, especially in developing countries, see generally Troy R. Jensen,
Comment, Organ Procurement: Various Legal Systems and Their Effectiveness, 22 Hous.
J. Int'l L. 555 (2000).
58. For a general discussion of developments in the animal rights movement, see The
Animal Ethics Reader 1-10 (Susan J. Armstrong & Richard G. Botzler eds., 2003). The
current debate over animal rights was sparked by the publication of philosopher Peter
Singer's Animal Liberation in 1975. See generally Singer, supra note 32, at viii-x.
59. See, e.g., David DeGrazia, Great Apes, Dolphins, and the Concept of Personhood,
35 S.J. Phil. 301, 302 (1997) (identifying traits of dolphins and great apes that "might lead
one . . . to ask whether such animals are persons"); Robert W. Mitchell, Humans,
Nonhumans and Personhood, in The Great Ape Project 237, 237-45 (Paola Cavalieri &
Peter Singer eds., 1994) (arguing that primates meet most, but not all, criteria for
personhood established by philosopher Daniel Dennett).
60. See, e.g., Michael P.T. Leahy, Against Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective
23-26 (rev. 1994) (analyzing use of the concept of the person in animal rights arguments);
Steven J. Bartlett, Roots of Human Resistance to Animal Rights: Psychological and
Conceptual Blocks, 8 Animal L. 143, 147 (2002) (noting that courts rarely consider
animals "ends in themselves" and instead attempt to locate their value somewhere between
personhood and mere property); David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50
Duke LJ. 473, 502 (2000) ("Animals are not humans and are not inanimate objects.
Presently, the law has only two clearly separated categories: property orjuristic persons.");
Alan White, Why Animals Cannot Have Rights, in Animal Rights and Human Obligations
119, 120-21 (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 2d ed. 1989) (arguing that only persons can
have rights because "only a person can be the subject of such predications"). But see Gary
L. Francione, Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement
32-34 (1996) (noting some animal advocates have backed away from "all or nothing"
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Although much of the animal rights literature is utilitarian in na-
ture, 61 some of the arguments are framed within social contract theory,
suggesting that certain animals have the cognitive sophistication to be
considered auxiliary members of the social contract and therefore de-
serve Kantian respect.62 These arguments suggest that the legal concept
of the person is not only a central concept for human rights discourse,
but is also an avenue for conceptual expansion of human rights. 63 One
could expand the concept of the person to include animals that are not
even biological human beings, either because they display some minimal
rational agency or some of the psychological properties of human be-
ings. 64 In this case, again, the various elements of the concept of the
person stand in pronounced tension. While advocates for animal rights
argue that animals exhibit some of the rational and psychological attrib-
utes of personhood, they readily admit that they seek expansion for non-
human beings, i.e., for members of the animal kingdom who fall outside of
the biologically defined group of Homo sapiens. Again, the important
approach on animal rights in favor of arguing for animal welfare, regardless of theoretical
foundation for that treatment); Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights 152-54 (1983)
(putting animals into the category of moral patients, i.e., beings who are not sophisticated
enough for moral agency but may nonetheless have moral interests); Singer, supra note 32,
at 9-17 (urging ethical treatment of animals because of their capacity to feel pain but
refraining from using concept of the person).
61. See, e.g., Tom Regan, Animal Rights, Human Wrongs 63-66 (2003) [hereinafter
Regan, Human Wrongs] (discussing utilitarian justifications for animal rights); Singer,
supra note 32, at 7 (appealing to Jeremy Bentham and utilitarian tradition generally).
62. See Paola Cavalieri, The Animal Question: Why Nonhuman Animals Deserve
Human Rights 94 (Catherine Wollard trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (1999) (discussing
animal rights theories in terms of Kantian intrinsic value); Immanuel Kant, Grounding for
the Metaphysics of Morals 36-37 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett 3d ed. 1993) (1785)
[hereinafter Kant, Grounding] (positing rational nature as the foundation for the
categorical imperative); Mark Rowlands, Animal Rights: A Philosophical Defence 120-58
(1998) (using Rawls's social contract framework to argue for animal rights). However,
Kant himself did not analyze the rights of animals in terms of their participation in the
social contract. Rather, Kant suggested that we should refrain from animal cruelty because
it is a prelude to engaging in cruelty towards fellow human beings. Consequently, our duty
to animals stems from our indirect duty to mankind. See Immanuel Kant, Duties Towards
Animals and Spirits, in Lectures on Ethics 239, 239-41 (Louis Infield trans., The Century
Co. 1930) (1924). For a Kantian argument for animal rights that does not make reference
to persons, see Regan, Human Wrongs, supra note 61, at 96 (concluding that all human
beings and all animal beings "possess inherent value" and deserve "equal treatment"
because both are "subjects-of-a-life").
63. See Cavalieri, supra note 62, at 122 ("[T]he rhetorical usage of 'person,' far from
being useful only when it comes to strengthening the paradigm, turns out to be
particularly valuable in just those cases in which moral reform is at stake."); cf. Steve F.
Sapontzis, Aping Persons-Pro and Con, in The Great Ape Project, supra note 59, at 269,
270-72 (arguing that using personhood as basis for animal rights promotes species bias).
64. See Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to
Life, 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 21, 27 (1991) (arguing that "whales and some other sentient
mammals are entitled to human rights or at least to... the most fundamental entitlements
that we regard as part of the humanitarian tradition").
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point is not so much the validity of the arguments presented but the use
of the concept of the person while making them.
Often these arguments for animal rights proceed by way of anal-
ogy.6 5 First, biological human beings are entitled to rights. Second, ani-
mals share many of the characteristics of human beings, at least to some
lesser degree. Therefore, animals are entitled to at least some of the
same rights as human beings. Obviously, this argument only works if the
shared characteristics are relevant to the ascription of rights-otherwise
the analogy loses its force. 66 Personhood is often deployed in this con-
text to signal the use of this argument by analogy.67 Extending the con-
cept of the person to animals therefore merely indicates that they share
relevant characteristics with human beings and deserve rights on that ba-
sis. 68 This is not necessarily the correct analysis for all arguments in the
animal rights debate. Indeed, it may be the case that personhood signals
this kind of argument by analogy in some cases but not others. In any
case, to the extent that it does, it indicates that these arguments must
make reference to the relevant characteristics below the surface and that
the concept of the person signals the analogy but does not lend direct
force to it.
E. Patients with Multiple Personality Disorder
Consider next the difficult issue of criminal responsibility for pa-
tients with multiple personality disorder (also known as MPD).69 While
this diagnosis remains controversial in both the medical and legal litera-
ture,70 the concept of the person provides the conceptual framework for
65. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, and Pragmatic
Perspectives, in Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions 51, 66 (Cass R.
Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) [hereinafter Animal Rights: Current Debates]
("What is needed to persuade people to alter their treatment of animals.., is to learn to
feel animals' pains as our pains and to learn that (if it is a fact, which I do not know) we
can alleviate those pains without substantially reducing our standard of living . .
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Gary L. Francione, Animals-Property or Persons?, in Animal Rights:
Current Debates, supra note 65, at 108, 131 (arguing that animals are moral persons, a
designation that simply means "that the being has morally significant interests, that the
principle of equal consideration applies to that being, that the being is not a thing").
68. Id.
69. The condition is also referred to as dissociative identity disorder (DID). For a
medical analysis of MPD and DID, see Frank W. Putnam, Diagnosis and Treatment of
Multiple Personality Disorder 6-23 (1989) (discussing diagnostic criteria for MPD from the
third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III)).
70. See, e.g., Elyn R. Saks & Stephen H. Behnke, Jekyll on Trial: Multiple Personality
Disorder and Criminal Law 106 (1997) (arguing that patients with MPD should not be
held responsible for their crimes because, inter alia, punishment would harm innocent
alter personalities who are persons in their own right or blameless centers of
consciousness); Harold Merskey, The Manufacture of Personalities: The Production of
Multiple Personality Disorder, in Dissociative Identity Disorder: Theoretical and
Treatment Controversies 3, 28-29 (Lewis M. Cohen et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter
Dissociative Identity Disorder] (arguing that MPD patients often have real problems
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the debate. 71 In order to determine when and how patients with MPD
should be held criminally responsible for their actions, much of the de-
bate hinges on whether each "personality" identified by a psychologist
should be considered a distinct legal person.7 2 This is another clear case
where two interpretations of the concept of the person stand in some
tension. Patients with multiple personalities have one biological body but
exhibit extreme disunity in their lives. They often contradict themselves,
change their minds on important matters, and experience stark episodes
of forgetfulness and amnesia. 73 Some therapists make sense of this be-
havior by attributing these inconsistent actions to different psychological
personalities.7 4 Indeed, the patient may facilitate this process by naming
the personalities and presenting himself to the world in the guise of one
or more of them.75 In some cases, the personalities interact with each
other through the use of diaries and other communication methods.
Therapists treating these patients are faced with two ways of looking at
stemming from child abuse and other trauma and MPD diagnosis is unhelpful for
resolving these obstacles); August Piper, Jr., A Skeptical Look at Multiple Personality
Disorder, in Dissociative Identity Disorder, supra, at 135, 135-45 (arguing that diagnostic
criteria for MPD are imprecise and overinclusive). But see Phil Mollon, Multiple Selves,
Multiple Voices: Working with Trauma, Violation and Dissociation 122-23 (1996)
(arguing that MPD patients are "pretending" in some sense, although denying that this
impeaches the disorder and instead defining MPD as a "pathology of pretence").
71. The issue is discussed in Wilkes, supra note 34, at 109-31 (arguing that cases of
MPD represent "the fracturing of the concept of a person").
72. See, e.g., Elyn R. Saks, Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Responsibility,
10 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 185, 189-90 (2001) (using rubric of personhood and personal
identity to analyze legal responsibility of patients with multiple personalities); Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong & Stephen Behnke, Criminal Law and Multiple Personality Disorder:
The Vexing Problems of Personhood and Responsibility, 10 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 277, 277
(2001) (discussing legal implications of conferring personhood on alter personalities in
patients with multiple personality disorder).
73. See, e.g., Eugene L. Bliss, Multiple Personality, Allied Disorders, and Hypnosis 121
(1986) (noting that multiple personalities often assume distinct name, identity, and
behavior that cannot be explained away by therapist influence).
74. Part of the therapist's goal is to treat the patient as charitably as possible, in the
sense of trying to find a rational explanation for his or her actions. See Carol Rovane, The
Bounds of Agency 201-02 (1998) (suggesting that therapists may need to forgo the
assumption that they are speaking with a single person in order to make rational sense of
patients' behavior). The need to find the greatest degree of rationality in an interlocutor
is not limited to the therapeutic context and is, of course, a generalized situation in
behavior interpretation. See Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation 27
(2001) (explaining principle of charity in linguistic interpretation); Simon Evnine, Donald
Davidson 102-03 (1991) (noting that charity principle requires a listener to make
assumptions about a speaker's beliefs); Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object 59
(1960) (discussing charity principle and suggesting the maxim that "assertions startlingly
false on the face of them are likely to turn on hidden differences of language," rather than
an interlocutor's irrationality).
75. See, e.g., Doris Bryant & Judy Kessler, Beyond Integration: One Multiple's
Journey 23-24 (1996) (describing development of patient's alternate personality during
her high school years); Putnam, supra note 69, at 84 (noting that patients frequently use
the first person plural to describe their behavior).
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the situation. First, they can see the patient as one agent, with one mind,
who is experiencing pronounced episodes of irrationality and psychologi-
cal discontinuity. Or, they can see multiple agents within their patient,
each of whom exhibits a distinct rational point of view on the world and
who acts accordingly. 76 In many cases, this might also lead the therapist
to conclude that the patient no longer displays a single unity of con-
sciousness but rather multiple centers of consciousness.
These disruptions are most compelling when the personalities pur-
sue incompatible projects-especially if one is criminal. 77 In such cases
an academic question of psychology becomes an acute problem for the
law.78 This radical disjuncture in behavior might be evidence that each
personality constitutes an individual rational agent, and in turn, a person
in his own right.79 This would have consequences both for legal rights
and responsibility."0 One can justify this ascription by noting that an in-
dividual personality goes to great lengths to form coherent and consistent
rational explanations, but does not feel compelled to offer explanations
76. See Rovane, supra note 74, at 201-02 (noting the unified rational point of view of
an alter personality); R.D. Hinshelwood, The Di-vidual Person: On Identity and
Identifications, in Attachment, Trauma and Multiplicity 211, 223-24 (Valerie Sinason ed.,
2002) (noting that persons are "influenced in 'who they think they are' and in what they
think their identity is, by external pressures, but also by pressures within themselves").
77. See Saks & Behnke, supra note 70, at 108 (providing example of Marie Moore,
whose alleged alter, BillyJoel, held a group of children hostage); State v. Moore, 113 N.J.
239, 310 (1988) (reversing Moore's conviction and death sentence because trial court
erred in not instructing jury on diminished capacity); see also United States v. Denny-
Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1021-22 (10th Cir. 1993) (overturning conviction and trial court's
refusal to allow insanity defense stemming from defendant's diagnosis of MPD).
78. See, e.g., Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d at 1014 (holding that there was "substantial
evidence" that defendant's host personality was unaware of criminal conduct of her alter
personality and was consequently unable to appreciate wrongfulness of conduct).
79. See Stephen E. Braude, First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the
Philosophy of Mind 206-10 (1995) (arguing that, in many respects, multiple personalities
are persons and even those who deny their personhood frequently treat them as individual
persons); Rovane, supra note 74, at 169-79 (arguing that multiple personalities should
qualify as persons). However, Rovane does not take a stand on the complicated clinical
issue of whether MPD is a valid psychological diagnosis; she simply argues that if multiple
personalities exist, then they are persons in their own right. Id. at 170. Nor does the
analysis presented in this Note require acceptance of the diagnosis. See infra note 86 and
accompanying text.
80. See Saks & Behnke, supra note 70, at 119 (setting explicit standards for legal
nonresponsibility in MPD cases). But see Kirkland v. State, 304 S.E.2d 561, 564 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1983) (accepting Ohio v. Grimsley proposition that an MPD patient is a single person
and concluding that "the law adjudges criminal liability of the person according to the
person's state of mind at the time of the act; we will not begin to parcel criminal
accountability out among the various inhabitants of the mind"); Ohio v. Grimsley, 444
N.E.2d 1071, 1075-76 (Ohio App. 1982) (concluding that defendant raising a multiple
personality disorder defense was "one person"). The Tenth Circuit in Denny-Shaffer
rejected the reasoning of these state court decisions and argued that the control executed
by the dominant personality at the time of the crime was crucial for determining legal
responsibility. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d at 1018. Other courts have found insufficient evidence
to resolve the controversy. See, e.g., State v. Wheaton, 850 P.2d 507, 514 (Wash. 1993).
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consistent with those of the other personalities. 81 While this is a strong
and controversial conclusion, 82 it is further evidence that our different
interpretations of personhood can stand in radical tension. While ra-
tional agents usually come one to a body, this need not always be the case,
as these rare psychological case studies indicate.8 3 These cases place ex-
treme pressure on our notion of the person as a biological human being
with a unified rational point of view.8 4
Of course, some might object that these cases are the product of
overeager therapists, susceptible patients, and criminal defendants look-
ing for legal excuses to avoid prosecution. Indeed, many psychiatrists
and critics have discredited the diagnosis and its theoretical underpin-
nings. 85 Fortunately, we need not address the controversy here, as noth-
ing in the current analysis requires an acceptance of the legitimacy of
MPD as a diagnosis. 86 Even if no verifiable case of the disorder could be
found, the conceptual point would remain: Faced with these circum-
stances, the concept of the person is invoked on both sides of the de-
bate-among those who would ascribe personhood to multiple personali-
ties and among those who would deny it-even though this novel
situation makes it difficult to extend the concept successfully. When deal-
ing with MPD, the biological concept of the human being conflicts with
our notion of rational agency, producing tension within the concept of
the person.
81. Rovane defends this standard and notes that the personalities in patients with
MPD demonstrate "distinct rational points of view." Rovane, supra note 74, at 169; see also
Braude, supra note 79, at 200 (describing personhood as "the set of psychological and
behavioral attributes in virtue of which we are able to adopt certain attitudes toward the
individual, interact with him as a more or less autonomous agent, and form a distinct
relationship with him").
82. Several theorists have parsed the issue differently. See, e.g., D.H.M. Brooks, The
Unity of the Mind 142 (1994) (arguing that split personalities are self-reflexive
consciousnesses within a single mind); Owen Flanagan, Self Expressions: Mind, Morals,
and the Meaning of Life 66-67 (1996) (arguing that patients with MPD exhibit multiple
narrators who have fractured the individual's narrative structure); cf. Ian Hacking,
Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory 221-23 (1995)
(arguing that MPD "does not furnish any evidence for any substantive philosophical thesis
about mind (or self, etc.)").
83. See generally Bryant & Kessler, supra note 75, at 4-6 (discussing Judy's story of
dissociation and creation of multiple personalities).
84. See Rovane, supra note 74, at 170.
85. See generally Joan Acocella, Creating Hysteria: Women and Multiple Personality
Disorder (1999) (offering broad critique of MPD and therapists who championed it).
Acocella argues that patients told fanciful stories because they were, among other things,
taking high doses of medications and undergoing hypnosis. Id. at 12-13; see also Merskey,
supra note 70, at 6 (discussing skepticism stemming from growing number of MPD cases
reported); Colin A. Ross, The Validity and Reliability of Dissociative Identity Disorder, in
Dissociative Identity Disorder, supra note 70, at 65, 81 (arguing that the question can only
be settled by designing an empirical study, as opposed to relying on case studies).
86. Indeed, the diagnosis has been discredited by, inter alia, therapeutic reliance on
hypnosis, recovered memory, and stories of satanic ritual abuse, all of which have attracted
serious criticism from the profession at large. See Acocella, supra note 85, at 39.
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F. Corporations as Group Persons
While patients with MPD may include multiple rational agents within
a single human body, the opposite is also possible: Several biological
human beings mightjoin together to form a single rational agent-a cor-
poration with legal status.8 7 There is wide disagreement in the literature
about the scope of rights for corporations under domestic and interna-
tional law.8 8 However, the disagreements take place against a common
background provided by the concept of the person.8 9 Furthermore, legal
theorists have provided a rigorous defense of the possibility that corpora-
tions are persons.90 Foreign legal systems grant corporations the basic
right to property and in doing so attribute legal personality to corpora-
tions. 91 U.S. law grants corporations many more rights, including legal
personality for purposes of tax law9 2 and a right to be free from unrea-
sonable search and seizure,93 but denies other rights, such as the right
87. For an excellent analysis of group agents and their properties using the language
of rational choice theory, see generally Philip Pettit, Collective Persons and Powers, 8 Legal
Theory 443 (2002). Pettit notes that collective persons display a unique rational
decisionmaking structure which can only be explained by analyzing them as a group entity,
rather than an aggregate of individual decisionmakers. This is the so-called "discursive
dilemma." Id. at 446-47, 451-55.
88. Compare S. Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 412 (1910) ("That a corporation is a
person, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is no longer open to
discussion."), and Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S.
181, 189 (1888) (holding that corporations are persons for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment), with Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 33
(1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Extension of the individual freedom of conscience
decisions to business corporations strains the rationale... beyond the breaking point. To
ascribe to such artificial entities an 'intellect' or 'mind' for freedom of conscience
purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality.").
89. See, e.g., Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business
Corporation in American Law, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1441, 1443 (1987) (tracing history of the
idea of the corporation as a legal person).
90. See, e.g., Peter A. French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility 35 (1984);
Roger Scruton, Corporate Persons, 63 Aristotlean Soc'y 239, 245-49 (Supp. 1989). But see
Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 Tul.
L. Rev. 563, 563 (1987) ("The edification of the corporation to the status of person is one
of the most enduring institutions of the law and one of the most widely accepted legal
fictions.").
91. The European Convention gives property rights both to natural persons and legal
persons in an attempt to explicitly confer some human rights to corporate entities. Protocol
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, 262 (entered into force May
18, 1954); see also Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636
(1819) (analyzing corporations as legal persons in contrast to natural persons and
recognizing their right to hold property).
92. See Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax Treatment of
Corporate Philanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 835, 842 (1997) (noting that "the tax law's
wholesale adoption of the corporate person fiction is well illustrated by the current rate
schedule applicable to corporations").
93. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (holding that corporation does not have to
produce books or papers if request constitutes unreasonable search and seizure).
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against self-incrimination.9 4 These rights have spurred a corresponding
movement to subject corporations to the same criminal liability as regular
citizens. This liability includes responsibility under international human
rights agreements9 5 and even U.S. domestic penal law.9 6 Again, the key
point here is not the specific legal rights or responsibilities attributed to
corporations. Rather, the proposition is two-fold: First, arguments attrib-
uting these rights and responsibilities make frequent reference to corpo-
rations as legal persons. Second, such arguments are paradigmatic exam-
ples of two elements standing in tension: the idea of the person as a
single biological human being and the idea of a person as a single ra-
tional agent. In the case of corporations, multiple biological human be-
ings combine to form a single rational agent for purposes of the law. The
result is an internal tension in our understanding of what it means to be a
person.
What this case study makes clear is that the concept of the person is
not wholly restricted to scenarios where the person has some kind of in-
trinsic worth-where, as it were, the intrinsic moral worth of the person
can be asserted. In these scenarios the concept is atomic and directly
grounds a moral intuition about moral worth. But corporate rights are
precisely the opposite: Corporations themselves have no intrinsic worth.
Rather, their worth is extrinsic and stems from the benefits flowing to the
natural individuals involved: the shareholders, the consumers, the em-
ployees, etc. To put the point more directly, the death of a corporation is
cause for concern only for its effects on individuals, including unemploy-
ment, the loss of investment savings, or the termination of valuable prod-
ucts and services. By contrast, the death of an individual may be cause for
concern regardless of its consequences, because the life of a human be-
ing has an intrinsic moral worth. While personhood's appearance in the
latter case may give the false impression that the concept is intimately tied
to moral worth, the term's use in the former case indicates something
altogether different.
94. See Scott A. Trainor, Note, A Comparative Analysis of a Corporation's Right
Against Self-Incrimination, 18 Fordham Int'l L.J. 2139, 2168 (1995) (noting that in the
United States, "a corporation has no right against self-incrimination").
95. See, e.g., Stephen G. Wood & Brett G. Scharffs, Applicability of Human Rights
Standards to Private Corporations: An American Perspective, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 531,
540-47 (Supp. 2002) (surveying different theories of corporate personhood and applying
human rights standards to them on that basis).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1200 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
that corporation can be held criminally liable for acts of supervisors who intentionally
disregarded the law). For a good discussion of the development of corporate criminal
liability, see CharlesJ. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense
to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 605, 607 (1995)
(noting that corporations are generally held criminally liable when their employees act
wrongly during the scope of their employment).
2005]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:209
G. States as Group Persons
A similar move is made in international law where states are treated
as legal persons for purposes of international relations.97 Indeed, the no-
tion of the state as a legal person goes back to the very genesis of the
nation-state as an actor within an international legal order.98 Further-
more, not only are states granted legal personhood, their personhood is
frequently invoked as the very reason they should be afforded rights in
the international system. 99 These rights include negotiating treaties, free-
dom from territorial aggression, and self-defense. Indeed, most rights in
international law are attributed to nations, and under at least one juris-
prudential theory, nations are considered to be the only legitimate bear-
ers of rights under international law.100 Also, legal theorists have gone to
some length to demonstrate how states act as unified rational agents
within the international system.' 0 ' A nation's status as a rational actor on
the international stage is one possible reason for considering it a rational
agent-and consequently, a legal person. This yields a similar result as
97. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 3100, 165
L.N.T.S. 19, 25 (referring to state as a "person of international law"; declaring that "the
federal state shall constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law"; and arguing
that juridical equality of states does not "depend upon the power which it possesses to
assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person under international
law" (emphasis added)).
98. Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations § 12, at 3 (Joseph Chitty ed.,
Philadelphia, T. &J.W. Johnson 1853) (1758) ("The law of nations is the law of sovereigns;
free and independent states are moral persons . . . ."); see also Immanuel Kant, The
Metaphysics of Morals 114 (Mary Gregor ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797)
(referring to the state "as a moral person ... living in relation to another state in the
condition of natural freedom").
99. See, e.g., Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, 124, U.N. Doc. A/
8082 (1970) (proclaiming that states are juridically equal and have the duty to respect the
personality of other states); Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2
U.S.T. 2394, 2418, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 54 (declaring that equality of states and their
subsequent rights depend "not upon its power to ensure the exercise thereof, but upon the
mere fact of its existence as a person under international law" (emphasis added)). The
charter also declares that recognition of one state by another means accepting the
personality of the new state. See id. art. 10, 2 U.S.T. at 2419.
100. Recognizing the personality of nonstate actors is a new and vanguard position in
international law. See, e.g., Martin A. Olz, Non-Governmental Organizations in Regional
Human Rights Systems, 28 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 307, 321-22 (1997) (arguing in favor
of extending legal personality to nonstate actors); PeterJ. Spiro, Accounting for NGOs, 3
Chi. J. Int'l L. 161, 167 (2002) (discussing implications of extending legal personality to
nonstate actors).
101. See, e.g., Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations 53 (1979)
(noting that it is helpful to view states as rational actors to understand their behavior,
though not necessarily helpful for prescribing their conduct); cf. John Rawls, The Law of
Peoples 32-33 (1999) (founding theory of international relations on a second original
position composed of rational agents, behind a veil of ignorance, who represent liberal
societies).
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that of the corporation: a group of biological human beings brought to-
gether to form one rational agent. Once again, the conceptual machin-
ery provided by the concept of the person is at the center of a debate
about legal rights and-just as before-the diverse elements of the con-
cept stand in some tension with each other. The notion of the person as
a biological human being sharply diverges from the notion of the person
as a rational agent.
As with multiple personality disorder, one could simply deny the em-
pirical reality (that nation-states exhibit a coherent rational point of view
in the same way as corporations) and consequently argue that nation-
states should not be considered legal persons. Again, this would be an
empirical claim and would not change the fact that international law,
whether justified in doing so or not, recognizes nation-states as legal per-
sons. Also, one could claim again that the term personhood is being used
as a placeholder to signal the conclusion of an argument about collective
rights, or that it is being used to signal an argument by analogy. But even
if these objections are accepted, this would simply be further evidence
that personhood does not directly ground a rights claim. Attributions of
personhood are not doing the logical work of moving the argument for-
ward. The concept of the person cannot be an essential battleground for
rights.
II. THE CONCEPT OF THE PERSON AS A CLUSTER CONCEPT
Part I pulled together diverse examples of legal arguments that place
the concept of the person at their center. While it may seem difficult to
draw together these diverse phenomena into a coherent framework, they
are united by one factor-their use of the concept of the person. By
harnessing examples from legal controversies in the human rights field,
Part I revealed deep strains on the concept. While personhood may be
an elastic notion, suitable for use in diverse arenas, the evidence in Part I
indicates that it is not nimble enough to ground arguments about the
human rights of embryos, fetuses, and children, while simultaneously
grounding arguments about animals, corporations, and nation-states.
The concept's coherency begins to break down when placed under such
extraordinary pressure.
The task of Part II is to develop a conceptual matrix to explain these
conflicts. This Part suggests that the concept of the person is a cluster
concept, an umbrella term that clusters together diverse and sometimes
contradictory notions.10 2 Objections to this view are presented and dis-
102. The idea of a cluster concept is well traveled within legal theory and philosophy.
Indeed, it is quite fashionable to argue that a proper analysis of a concept can only
proceed if it is recognized as a cluster concept. But this theoretical move has only
occasionally been made with the concept of the person. See, e.g., Amdlie Oksenberg
Rorty, A Literary Postscript: Characters, Persons, Selves, Individuals, in The Identities of
Persons 301, 302 (1976) (noting that "person" is used to "designate the entire class of
expressions that refer to the entities we have invented ourselves to be"). However, Rorty
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missed. The result is a dual understanding: The concept of the person is
often central to legal debates about human rights, but its use betrays a
deep tension in its components.
A. The Internal Tension Within the Concept of the Person
The concept of the person works well in ordinary discourse when we
want to refer to individuals who are, incontrovertibly, persons. This is
also true when typical persons appear before the legal system and their
status is not questioned. However, the cases outlined in Part I are excep-
tions and reside at the margins of law and morality. This is important to
remember because it explains why the term "person" has survived for so
long. The philosopher W.V. Quine once noted that words have only as
much precision as our current needs have required and it is foolish to
search for greater precision where none exists.1 0 3 Any attempt to find
this precision is bound to dissolve into legislation-i.e., a decision. 10 4 If
the concept of the person had broken down in all legal cases it would
have been revised, altered, or eliminated. It was not, which suggests that
in many situations the legal term is adequate.
But the fact that the concept breaks down in contentious cases is
important. The law functions not only to resolve typical cases but also to
extend existing concepts and categories to new facts. So, putting pres-
sure on the concept in cases of legal dispute exposes the deep tensions
within it. This Note suggests the following explanation for the source of
the conflict: The term "person" does not stand for a single concept but
rather for a cluster of ideas. In our daily lives, when we have no difficulty
picking out persons from nonpersons, the individual components of the
cluster are consistent with each other, i.e., there is no conflict between
them. But the legal controversies discussed in Part I demonstrate that the
law is rife with cases where the components of the cluster pull in opposite
directions.
What does it mean to say that our concept of the person is a cluster
concept? It is to say that the term is useful shorthand for a collection of
more precise-but somewhat theoretical-concepts. Our use of this clus-
ter concept has paved over our conflicting intuitions about its source, its
use, and its application. This phenomenon obscures deep disagreements
does not explicitly use the term "cluster concept," and does not identify the same
subconcepts that are highlighted in this Note. Id.; see also Jens David Ohlin, Personal
Identity Without Persons 37-45 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia
University) (on file with the Columbia University Library) (arguing that personhood is a
cluster concept and drawing on Rorty's discussion of the historical changes in the
concept).
103. See Willard Van Orman Quine, Book Review, 69 J. Phil. 488, 490 (1972)
(reviewing Identity and Individuation (Milton K. Munitz ed., 1971)) [hereinafter Quine,
Book Review] (arguing that "[t]o seek what is 'logically required' for sameness of person
under unprecedented circumstances is to suggest that words have some logical force beyond
what our past needs have invested them with" (emphasis added)).
104. Id.
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about what it means to be a person-disagreements which emerge in
human rights discourse. To say that personhood is a cluster concept
means that the umbrella concept works just fine sometimes, but that use of
the components instead of the umbrella term would promote clearer
analysis of the legal issues involved.
Although we use the word "person" to pick out these components,
which components we are picking out depends on the situation. Some-
times we use the word to talk about rational agents, sometimes to empha-
size continuity of consciousness, and sometimes to highlight biological
human beings. Most often, though, we use the word to reference two or
more of these discrete concepts. For our daily needs, then, the word does
remarkably well. It identifies a cluster of concepts that in quotidian dis-
course we have little need to distinguish. We talk about persons when we
want to identify "people" in the vulgar sense of the expression. It does
not matter if we are specifically thinking about bodies, minds, or agents,
because people are all of these things. But when put under extreme pres-
sure by a contentious legal situation, the concept becomes problematic
for the simple reason that it does not stand for just one concept, but for a
cluster of concepts that are often linked by contingent fact. 10 5
B. An Objection: Are the Lower-Level Components Any Better?
A possible objection presents itself at this juncture. This Note has
thus far argued that the concept of the person is a cluster concept and
that legal controversies about rights erupt when the components conflict
with each other. But are the component concepts any better for pur-
poses of legal dispute resolution? There certainly are conflicts about
what it means to be a biological human being, to exhibit continuity of
consciousness, or to be a rational agent. To continue an example from
Part I, there are deep disagreements about the status of the fetus inde-
pendent of any issues of personhood. Is the fetus a separate biological
entity from its mother, or do they constitute a single biological animal?10 6
Or consider again the case of corporations. An entire field of inquiry is
105. The idea of a cluster concept has some affinity with Wittgenstein's
characterization of the concept of a game: It has blurry edges and can be identified only
by "family resemblance." In other words, the concept is gathered around a group of
similar exemplars, without necessarily having exact or specific criteria for which ones
should be included under the concept. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations §§ 67-71 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Prentice Hall 3d ed. 1958) (1953).
106. Indeed, these issues were very much part of the discussion initiated by the Roe
decision. See, e.g., Ilana Hurwitz, Collaborative Reproduction: Finding the Child in the
Maze of Legal Motherhood, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 127, 157 n.163 (2000) (noting that some
commentators consider the fetus to be part of the mother's body); Radhika Rao, Property,
Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 359, 363 (2000) ("The law of the body is
currently in a state of confusion and chaos.").
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devoted to analyzing conflicts about the nature and behavior of rational
agents.10 7 There is hardly unanimity in either case.
The analysis presented here does not suggest that the individual com-
ponent concepts are free from vagueness, imprecision, or outright inco-
herence. There are indeed preexisting conceptual problems within the
components, problems which are under investigation by legal theory and
the philosophy of biology, mind, and action respectively. But in pushing
the analysis one level down we can excise one source of the conflict-the
conflict between the components. While the component concepts might
suffer from their own problems (local inconsistencies, vagueness, etc.),
they are nonetheless discrete concepts. And discrete concepts, though by
no means free of problems, are free from the kind of conflict that can
plague a cluster concept.
Consider our intuitions about what it means to be a biological
animal. The issue seems rife with vagueness. When a body has an arm
replaced it is clearly still the same body. And if all limbs are replaced it is
probably still the same body, though the question may be more conten-
tious.1 08 What if almost all of its body is replaced? At some point, we are
likely to think that we are no longer dealing with the same body.10 9 We
have intuitions about the extremes, but in the middle case we have diffi-
culty answering the question. The difficulty is not with our linguistic
competence with the concept; rather the concept fails to fit these margi-
nal cases. In essence, it is not that we do not know how to use the word in
the middle cases-the problem is with the vagueness of the concept itself.
In these middle cases the question might be empty.I 0
So it is clear that the component concepts are not perfect. But this is
not evidence that personhood is not a cluster concept. It is not necessary
that the components be free from vagueness or any other local inconsis-
tency to accept the suggestion that the concept of the person is a cluster
concept. The only requirement is that in recognizing personhood as a
cluster concept we diagnose the tension between the components. The
recognition that personhood is a cluster concept did not create the vague-
ness within the component concepts. The vagueness was already there
implicitly; now we just see it explicitly. So recognizing that personhood is
a cluster concept improves the situation by making clear how the concept
actually functions in difficult legal cases.
107. For a pathbreaking discussion of the implications of decision theory, see
generally Issac Levi, Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict (1986).
108. Parfit addresses this issue in a thought experiment called The Physical Spectrum,
where scientists create a physical replica of a body with new matter by replacing one at a
time an original particle with a replicated particle. Parfit asks at which point in the process
a new body comes into existence, ultimately concluding that it may be indeterminate at
what point a physical body ceases to be the same physical body. See Parfit, Reasons, supra
note 27, at 234-43.
109. Id. at 235.
110. In fact, Parfit notes that "[w]e could not discover what the critical percentage is,
by carrying out some of the cases in this imagined spectrum." Id.
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Having explained the evidence in Part I by reconceiving personhood
as a cluster concept, this Note now turns to a more generalized, theoreti-
cal explanation of how the concept of the person is used in these debates.
Therefore, Part III diagnoses the argumentative role played by the con-
cept and suggests that, although central, personhood is ill equipped to
perform the task we have delegated to it. The analysis is accomplished by
dividing up the arguments into three conceptual categories-each of
which represents a different use of the concept. Part IV then explores in
what circumstances, if any, it is appropriate to retain personhood for le-
gal reasoning.
III. THREE USES OF THE CONCEPT OF THE PERSON AND THEIR EMPTINESS
We now move from identifying examples of personhood in human
rights debates to considering the argumentative role played by the con-
cept. At first glance it would appear that the concept of the person is
central and indispensable for making the human rights claims surveyed
in Part I. But the argument in this Part challenges this assumption.
While the concept is indeed central to human rights discourse, this Note
argues that it obscures the very issues it should address. This Note identi-
fies three basic classes of human rights arguments and show how, in all
three, the concept of the person carries little of the argumentative load.
The first kind of argument interprets personhood as synonymous with
biological human beings-this will be referred to as a naturalistic argu-
ment. The second argument uses person in a non-naturalistic sense be-
cause it goes above and beyond the biological concept. The third argu-
ment uses personhood to signal the conclusion of an argument-this is a
normative use. Although these three arguments do not necessarily ex-
haust all possible uses for the concept, they do nonetheless occupy the
vast majority of human rights claims about persons. It is therefore con-
ceptually significant that personhood fails to perform strong argumenta-
tive work in these three classes. Part IV of this Note then endorses a new
analysis and suggests changes to human rights theory.
A. The Naturalistic Conception of the Person as a Biological Human Being
When we look at how the concept of the person was used in the
human rights arguments from Part I, there are three different ways to
interpret its role. The first is the naturalistic"' conception of the person
111. The label "naturalistic" is meant to invoke the philosophical doctrine of
naturalism, or the idea that everything real belongs to the world of nature. A naturalist
tends to prefer scientific categories, since natural science is the preferred method for
investigating the natural world. A committed naturalist would therefore interpret "person"
as synonymous with human beings, since biology's investigation of the natural world
deserves a privileged epistemic status. See, e.g., Willard Van Orman Quine, Pursuit of
Truth 19 (rev. ed. 1992) (arguing that "our information about the world comes only
through impacts on our sensory receptors").
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as a biological human being.' 12 It grounds a human rights claim by as-
serting that the capacities of the biological human being are morally and
legally significant and entail certain rights. The structure of the argu-
ment is: (a) x is a person; (b) persons have certain characteristics; (c)
these characteristics are morally and legally significant; therefore (d) per-
son x is entitled to these rights. And what it means to be a person is
cashed out as roughly synonymous with a biological human being.
There are two reasons why the structure of this argument is problem-
atic. First, the real conceptual work is not being done by personhood at
all-the lower-level notion of the biological human being is carrying the
argumentative load. Since biological human beings have characteristics
that are morally and legally significant, biological human beings deserve
human rights. The biological concept is grounding the claim-not the
concept of the person-so it is the lower-level facts that are significant for
human rights. This does not by itself suggest that the naturalistic concep-
tion of persons is wrong. What it does suggest, though, is that if this
analysis of personhood is correct, then the concept is less important for
human rights than one might have thought. What really matters for pur-
poses of settling a human rights claim is the biological concept of the
human being.
Second, interpreting the concept of the person as essentially biologi-
cal leaves out too many instances where we may want to ascribe rights, for
example, to organizations,'" 3 corporations,' 1 4 or nation-states. 1 15 We
would then be obliged to offer a completely independent basis for grant-
ing rights to those entities. One might respond that we should ascribe
rights to these other entities on a different basis. In other words, corpo-
rations might have rights regardless of their status as persons." t 6 While
this is certainly a plausible avenue, it suggests, once again, that the con-
cept of the person adds little to the concept of the human being, i.e., the
biological concept is doing all of the work here. It also produces the uncomfort-
able situation of arguing whether someone is a person in order to deter-
112. Several philosophers have argued forcefully that the concept of the person
should be organized exclusively around the biological concept of the human being or that
personal identity should be analyzed exclusively in terms of bodily identity. See Erik T.
Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology 4 (1997); Wiggins,
supra note 25, at 225-26; Bernard Williams, Are Persons Bodies?, in Problems of the Self
64, 70 (1973) [hereinafter Williams, Bodies]; Bernard Williams, Bodily Continuity and
Personal Identity, in Problems of the Self, supra, at 19, 19; Judith Jarvis Thomson, People
and Their Bodies, in Reading Parfit 202, 202-05 (Jonathan Dancy ed., 1997); Judith Jarvis
Thomson, Ruminations on an Account of Personal Identity, in On Being and Saying 215,
233-38 (Judith Jarvis Thomson ed., 1987).
113. See supra note 100.
114. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
116. One might, for example, grant legal rights to corporations on a purely utilitarian
theory.
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mine if he or she gets human rights.1 17 This is precisely the kind of rea-
soning that seems backward because it is the underlying facts that are
morally important for human rights, not the upper-level fact of
personhood.
This Note's argument does not require adopting the position that
the biological concept of the human being is the ultimate ground of per-
sonhood. Rather, the argument is simply that ifpersonhood is ultimately
reducible to a biological notion, then two consequences follow. First, per-
sonhood cannot be used, as it is now, in scenarios that exceed the biologi-
cal paradigm, e.g., corporations, nation-states, and even multiple person-
alities. Second, if personhood is defined in purely biological terms,
personhood cannot play a greater logical role than the underlying biolog-
ical concept. This would not be a radical conclusion-it would simply
clarify that personhood does not directly ground a rights based argument.
B. A Non-Naturalistic Conception of Persons
The second way to interpret the concept of the person in a human
rights argument is non-naturalistically. "Non-naturalistic" means that the
concept is broader and more expansive than the biological notion of the
human being, and indeed, not organized around biology at all. To un-
derstand the concept of the person in this way, it must be organized
around the principle of rational agency,1 18 psychology, or cognitive
properties, suggesting that personhood is linked to the properties of ra-
tional agency rather than the properties of a single biological human
body. This is an expansive reading of the concept of the person. 119
The benefit of this view is its power to ascribe rights to group agents
such as corporations and nation-states. The expansive reading allows
greater flexibility in attributing human rights because the concept of the
person is not limited to biological human beings. Rational agents that do
not correspond one-to-one with biological human beings are entitled to
rights, which accords with common sense intuitions about the rights of
117. See Quine, Book Review, supra note 103, at 490. The problem is that such so-
called "investigations" inevitably become an exercise in legislation. In other words, at a
certain point, trying to find out whether someone meets the metaphysical criteria for
personhood might just degenerate into an ethical decision as to who should be considered a
person. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 42 (1986) (distinguishing cases of genuine
legal debate and cases of arbitrary linedrawing).
118. The agency criterion is also advocated by Korsgaard. See Christine M.
Korsgaard, Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit, 18
Phil. & Pub. Aff. 101, 109-15 (1989). Korsgaard emphasizes that rational agents are
committed to life plans that require rational unity over time, although she does not
explicitly endorse the possibility that corporations and other group entities could meet her
Kantian standard.
119. This view is echoed in Rovane, supra note 74, at 71-72. By arguing for the view
that persons are agents (and who are capable of engaging in agency-regarding relations),
Rovane recognizes the possibility that one biological human being may contain more than
one rational agent, or conversely, that one rational agent may contain more than one
human being (as is the case with a corporation). Id. at 137-42.
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group agents (such as corporations). 20 But the non-naturalistic concep-
tion has a downside because it violates common sense in one important
regard: We generally assume that the concept of the person has some-
thing to do with biological human beings and entirely untying the two
concepts strains credulity. 12 1
In any case, when the non-naturalistic conception of the person is
deployed in a human rights argument, once again a lower-level concept is
doing the real argumentative work-in this case, the concept of rational
agency. If a human rights argument relies on such a theory, it seems
clear that the moral urgency comes not from the concept of the person
but from the lower-level implications of what it means to be an agent.122
Rational agency is morally relevant because it entails certain claims about
the human rights necessary to exercise that agency. 123 There is nothing
that the concept of the person adds to the concept of the rational agent.
Once again, the concept of the person proves dispensable.
One might object that the above analysis misses an entirely differ-
ent-yet compelling-non-naturalistic view of the person: the idea of a
biological human being animated by a soul. While this is a minority view
in the philosophical literature, 24 and legal analysis rarely makes much
use of it, the view remains a powerful account for a sizeable percentage of
the population with a religious outlook. 125 Undoubtedly this view is non-
120. This also accords with their rational deliberative structure. See Pettit, supra note
87, at 448.
121. The literature on personal identity includes several examples where intuition
supports the theory that the concept of the person must have something to do with our
bodies. See, eg., Williams, Bodies, supra note 112, at 70 (suggesting position that persons
"form a class of material bodies"). But see Rovane, supra note 74, at 40-45 (arguing that
scholarly literature as a whole demonstrates that our intuitions about these thought
experiments are inherently conflicted).
122. For example, Alan Gewirth's derivation of rights appeals exclusively to the
properties of persons having to do with rational and moral agency. Alan Gewirth, Reason
and Morality 48-50 (1978).
123. Arguably, the inherent rights found by both Kant and Rawls stem from a
person's capacity to engage in rational or moral agency. For Kant, an agent's capacity to
reason in accordance with the categorical imperative marks him or her with dignity in the
Kingdom of Ends; individuals who participate in universal human legislation are afforded
this protection. See Kant, Grounding, supra note 62, at 39-40. For Rawls, a rational
agent's position as a bargainer in the social contract yields a social order that respects his
or her rights; creatures without the rational sophistication to bargain at the social contract
table are not parties to the contract and are not, properly speaking, appropriate subjects
for moral rights. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 123 (rev. ed. 1999) (discussing
assumption that "persons in the original position are rational"); see also Gewirth, supra
note 122, at 63 (arguing that rational agents must be committed to the view that they have
a right to the means necessary to achieve their ultimate goals).
124. Cf. Richard Swinbume, Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory, in Personal
Identity 1, 27 (Sidney Shoemaker & Richard Swinburne eds., 1984) (arguing that persons
are composed of material and immaterial substance).
125. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 133 (1973) (noting that English common
law dealt with abortion by permitting it up to the point when the fetus became a person by
being infused with a soul).
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naturalistic, because it views the person as more than mere biology, but
rather a biological component animated by divine substance. 126 Indeed,
many religious individuals might negotiate the difficult moral terrain of
the scenarios in Part I by asking whether the entity in question still has a
soul. There is much that could be said at this point about the validity of
these religious views. However, the argument presented here does not
require a deeper consideration of them. Consider, for the sake of argu-
ment, that the religious view of persons is correct. If persons are biologi-
cal bodies with animated souls, this suggests that the moral worth of the
person would be a function of their soul-the divine substance within.
Regardless of the truth of this claim, it suggests yet again that personhood
cannot be the absolute foundation. The soul is the real engine of this
argument.
C. Personhood as a Purely Normative Concept
There is, of course, a third alternative: The concept of the person is
a completely normative determination, so when we ascribe the predicate
of legal personhood we do nothing more than recognize an entity as a valid
object of legal concern. This third alternative suggests that we have com-
pletely misunderstood how the concept works in a human rights argu-
ment. We do not determine that an entity is a person first and then chart
the moral and legal consequences of that ascription later. Rather, the
ascription of personhood is nothing but our declaration that an entity is a
valid object of our moral concern. In other words, personhood is a moral
and legal concept all the way down (as opposed to a metaphysical concept
with legal consequences). We do not ascribe human rights because an
entity is a person-it is a person because we ascribe human rights to it.
We have it all backwards.
For example, human rights theorists sometimes draw a distinction
between natural and legal persons.127 This is common when discussing
the legal rights of corporations and other group entities. 128 Also, some
human rights instruments make explicit reference to legal persons when
attributing rights to corporations or labor unions. 129 This is a perfect
example of legal personhood as a purely normative concept. Since the
corporation is a valid subject of human rights-e.g., it deserves the right
126. Descartes, supra note 22, at 126-29 (concluding that God is the ultimate cause of
the human mind).
127. The distinction goes back at least as far as Hobbes, if not farther. See Thomas
Hobbes, Leviathan 88 (Richard E. Flathman & David Johnston eds., Norton 1997) (1651)
(noting distinction between natural and "Artificiall [sic]" or "Feigned" persons).
128. See, e.g., French, supra note 90, at 33 (discussing legal personhood of
corporations separately from "moral and metaphysical matters"); Scruton, supra note 90,
at 259 (discussing law's conferral of legal personality to a corporation "so as to conduct its
affairs as an independent legal entity"); supra Part I.G (discussing states as group persons).
129. See, e.g., Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, art. 43, 21 U.S.T. 607, 669-70,
6 I.L.M. 310, 320-21, amending the Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr.
30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 48 (referring to the "juridical personality" of unions).
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to property-then corporations deserve to be called persons. The desig-
nation has no additional meaning.
There is nothing wrong with this alternative analysis, although it
demonstrates-once again-that the concept of the person is grounding
little of the argument. If all that being a person means is that one can be
a valid subject of human rights, then one cannot turn around and justify
that ascription by appealing to an entity's personhood (on pain of vicious
circularity). The concept of the person is just a placeholder for moral or
legal concern. But if that is the case, it cannot simultaneously serve as a
reason for moral concern. The reasons must be external to the concept of
the person. The reason-giving force in the argument is being supplied by
the underlying reasons for ascribing personhood in the first place. So
under this third alternative, the concept of the person still plays little role
in moving the argument forward.
D. A Common Diagnosis
We then arrive at a common diagnosis for why the concept of the
person is dispensable in all three possibilities: It is the underlying facts of
personhood-not personhood itself-that are morally and legally impor-
tant for human rights. This does not mean that personhood is empty or
should be eliminated from the lexicon of human rights dialogue, only
that the concept is shouldering little of the argumentative weight. But it
is important not to exaggerate this claim. To say that a concept is entirely
empty is a much stronger claim than the one made here. The concept of
the person-or at least the different versions examined here-has some
conceptual content. But the analysis does suggest that personhood
should not be the central battleground for human rights discourse.
These claims deserve further explanation.
1. The Argument from Below. - Derek Parfit has defended a version of
this argument called the Argument from Below.130 Although he used the
Argument from Below to slightly different effect, the underlying rationale
is the same. Parfit has argued that "whenever there are facts at different
levels, it is always the lowest-level facts which matter."'131 There are sev-
eral examples with which to explain the Argument from Below, taken
from many subject areas other than the concept of the person. Being
married consists in certain lower-level facts: living together under one
roof in a committed romantic or sexual relationship, the intention to
raise a family together, the pooling of financial resources, or some combi-
130. Derek Parfit, The Unimportance of Identity, in Identity 13, 32-33 (Henry Harris
ed., 1995) [hereinafter Parfit, Unimportance]. For a discussion of Parfit's Argument from
Below and objections to it, see Ohlin, supra note 102, at 65-76 (arguing that the Argument
from Below applies to personhood, although doing so for purpose of resolving dispute in
analytic philosophy about personal identity).
131. Parfit, Unimportance, supra note 130, at 32-33.
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nation of the above. 132 When considering such things as spousal rights
(such as inheritance 133 or medical insurance for dependents134 ), many
would argue that the lower-level facts matter most. In other words, mar-
riage consists solely of certain lower-level facts (like living together in a
committed romantic relationship), and those who fulfill these facts
should receive these rights even in the absence of a marriage certificate.
When states recognize common law marriages in the absence of a mar-
riage ceremony, they are invoking reasoning similar to the Argument
from Below. 13 5 The assumption behind common law marriages is that
the lower-level facts are important and the higher-level fact of getting
married is significant only insofar as it usually consists in these lower-level
facts. 1
36
The concept of the person may be similar. Just as being married
simply consists in certain other facts, so too being a person just consists in
certain other facts. In the former case these other facts are that two peo-
ple live together in a particular domestic arrangement. In the latter case,
these other facts are about biological human beings, rational agents, and
psychology. In both cases, it is surely the lower-level facts that are legally
significant for human rights. Just as it would be perilous to ignore those
lower-level facts in the absence of a marriage certificate (as one might be
tempted to do if one looked solely at the higher-level fact), so too would
it be perilous to think that being a person has an intrinsic importance
132. See, e.g., CarolynJ. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 Colum.
L. Rev. 75, 81 (2004) (defending ideal of marriage as an "egalitarian liberal community").
133. See, e.g., Kris Bulcroft & Phyllis Johnson, A Cross-National Study of the Laws of
Succession and Inheritance: Implications for Family Dynamics, 2 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 1, 25
(2000) (noting that evolving definition of "family" is challenging standard rules for
succession).
134. See, e.g., Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A
Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1164,
1194 (1992) (describing how employee benefits such as health insurance "are a driving
force for domestic partnership recognition"); Lindsay Brooke King, Note, Enforcing
Conventional Morality Through Taxation?: Determining the Excludability of Employer-
Provided Domestic Partner Health Benefits Under Sections 105(b) and 106 of the Internal
Revenue Code, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 301 (1996) (exploring how definition of
"dependent" impacts health benefits for domestic partners).
135. For an analysis of the general rationale for recognizing common law marriages,
see John B. Crawley, Is the Honeymoon Over for Common-Law Marriage: A Consideration
of the Continued Viability of the Common-Law Marriage Doctrine, 29 Cumb. L. Rev. 399,
402-04 (1999) (tracing development of common law marriage doctrine).
136. A similar argument is often used to justify same-sex marriages. For an overview
of recent developments in this area, see generally David L. Chambers, What if?. The Legal
Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95
Mich. L. Rev. 447 (1996) (advocating extension of existing marital law and concomitant
regulatory regime to same-sex partnerships); Developments in the Law II-Inching Down
the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United
States and Europe, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2004 (2003) (surveying international trends in
recognition of gay marriage, hypothesizing that recognition of same-sex marriage rights
will differ in the United States, and arguing for extension of equal protection doctrine in
this field).
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over and above the facts that constitute it (such as being a biological
human being or a rational agent). Since it is the lower-level facts that are
important, the concept of the person itself cannot be necessary for
human rights.
2. The Argument from Above. - The Argument from Below is not with-
out its critics. For example, the philosopher Mark Johnston has argued
that the Argument from Below leaves Parfit vulnerable to a charge of
nihilism.1 3 7 Johnston's objection uses an example from metaphysics.
Say, for example, that a scientific view of the world is correct and every-
thing that exists is created from physical particles; this doctrine is called
physicalism. If physicalism is true, then every fact about the world just
consists of facts about physical particles. But here is where the difficulty
arises, according to Johnston. Individual physical particles are rather in-
significant in themselves; they are significant only insofar as they consti-
tute the larger objects of our social existence. According to the doctrine
of physicalism, however, everything is reducible to physical particles, so
nothing matters at all. That is why, according to Johnston, Parfit's argu-
ment runs the risk of degenerating into nihilism. 138
The objection demands a response. 139 Parfit makes a distinction be-
tween reductionism about what exists and reductionism about facts. 140
Reductionism about what exists is an ontological theory, which is to say
that it is a point about the ultimate furniture of the universe. 141 This
kind of reductionism argues that some upper-level entities do not exist at
all-the only things that truly exist are the lower-level entities that com-
pose them. Contrast this with reductionism about facts, which means that
some facts can be (and perhaps ought to be) reduced to other facts. 142
So reductionism about what exists is ontological, while reductionism
about facts is conceptual. Parfit's point is that the former does not entail
the latter; while physicalism dictates that everything is composed of parti-
cles, it might not be the case that all facts can be reduced to facts about
particles.' 43 For example, one could coherently claim that while corpora-
tions are just composed of individual human beings, it is not the case that
all facts about corporations can be reduced to facts about individual
human beings.144 Reductionism about what exists differs from reduction-
ism about facts and so, even if physicalism is correct, reductionism does
137. See Mark Johnston, Human Concerns Without Superlative Selves, in Reading
Parfit, supra note 112, at 149, 168.
138. Id. at 168-69.
139. One response to the objection is to deny physicalism outright. But it is unclear
to what degree Johnston's argument depends on the truth of physicalism.
140. See Parfit, Unimportance, supra note 130, at 32-33.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 33.
144. See Pettit, supra note 87, at 457-58 (arguing that it is sometimes "reasonable,
even compulsory, to think of the integrated collectivity as an intentional subject").
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not entail the view that nothing matters. This rehabilitates the Argument
from Below in the face of Johnston's objection.
3. The Argument from Below Applied to Persons. - The Argument from
Below certainly does not apply universally, regardless of the subject mat-
ter or the kinds of facts at issue. For example, facts about corporations
need not always be reduced to facts about their members. It would be
wrong to suggest that whenever there are facts at different levels, the up-
per-level facts must be disregarded in favor of the lower-level facts. But
one can respond to this objection by noting, along with Parfit, that
merely conceptual facts cannot be intrinsically important. "What matters is
reality, not how it is described," he writes. 14 5 For conceptual facts, what
matters are the lower-level facts that constitute them. And merely con-
ceptual facts cannot, by themselves, carry moral or legal significance. 146
Personhood is just such a conceptual fact because what it means to be a
person can be reduced to facts about biological human beings, rational
agents, and psychology. Personhood has no objective content above and
beyond these facts.
A Parfitian Argument from Below for persons would run like this:147
Being a person just consists in x (where x is being a human being and a
rational agent with unity of consciousness). Since being a person just
consists in x, then being a person is a mere conceptual fact. Conse-
quently, being a person cannot be intrinsically important. Its importance
is derived purely from the importance of x. This Argument from Below
could be challenged with aJohnstonian Argument from Above. While we
argue that being a person is important only because it consists in x, a
Johnstonian might argue that x only matters because it constitutes being
a person.
Consider the brain-death scenario from People v. Eulo.1 48 A woman is
shot in the head and critically injured. 149 She is rushed to the hospital,
but there is little the doctors can do.1 50 The damage to her brain leaves
her brain dead, though the rest of her bodily functions continue, albeit
with medical assistance. 15 1 An EEG detects no brain activity. 15 2 But the
victim continues to breathe, her heart continues to pump, and her blood
continues to circulate. 1 53 She cannot exercise rational agency, nor does
she exhibit any psychological continuity with her previous experiences.
145. See Parfit, Unimportance, supra note 130, at 33.
146. Id.
147. Parfit does not make this argument. This is a reconstruction of what a Parfitian
would say if they believed that being a person was a mere conceptual fact.
148. 472 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. 1984); see supra Part I.C.
149. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d at 289.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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However, her status as a biological animal is unchanged. 15 4 Is she dead?
Is she still the same person?
On the view being explored, being a person is a mere conceptual
fact because it consists solely in lower-level facts, such as those described
in Eulo. Answering the metaphysical questions (e.g., is she a person?) will
not help us decide if the victim is a valid subject of human rights, since we
already have the information we need. And it is these facts that are im-
portant, not whether the term "person" applies. What matters is reality
and not how we describe it. The Argument from Below, therefore, clearly
supports this analysis of personhood.
In contentious cases we often ask ourselves if the victim is a person
and we take these discussions to be about something more than just the
proper use of a linguistic term. We think of these questions as crucial
and worthy of civic debate. 155 And they are-but only because such ques-
tions are shorthand for asking if the object in question is an appropriate
object of moral concern. Having antecedently assumed that it is persons
that are the appropriate objects of moral concern, we frame our dialogue
in the language of personhood as a way of deciding how we should treat
someone. If we conclude that someone deserves moral treatment, we call
her a person. If we do not, then we choose an alternate concept. This is
an example of the purely normative use of the concept described in Part
III.C.
But no intrinsic importance derives from our use of this label. What
is important is reality, not how we describe it. The different answers (i.e.,
yes, this is a person, or no, this is not) are not different ways the world
might be. The difference is merely conceptual. And because the differ-
ence is conceptual, the Argument from Below applies and the impor-
tance flows upward. Personhood is important only because it constitutes
being a biological human being, with continuity of consciousness, and
rational agency. But the essential importance derives from these lower-
level facts. 156 If we know these lower-level facts, we know everything that
154. Indeed, if the patient was not still a living biological organism, doctors would not
have been able to harvest his organs. Id.
155. See, for example, the case of Terri Schiavo, a Florida patient in a persistent
vegetative state. Her husband wanted the hospital to withhold nutrition and won the right
to do so in court, but the Florida legislature passed a law authorizing the Governor to issue
a one-time executive order for her continued treatment. 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 418 (Oct. 21,
2003), available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/laws/03aws/ch-2003-418.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review); Fla. Exec. Order No. 03-201 (Oct. 21, 2003), available at
http://sun6.dms.state.fl.us/eognew/eog/orders/2003/october/eo2003-201-10-22-
03.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851
So. 2d 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). The Florida Supreme Court subsequently struck
down the law, holding that it violated the separation of powers doctrine under the state
constitution. Bush v. Schiavo, No. SC04-925, 2004 Fla. LEXIS 1539, at *3 (Sept. 23, 2004).
156. Which lower-level facts constitute personhood is a deeply controversial question.
There might be several competing theories of personhood. But this is a logically separate
question. The point here is that personhood is extraneous. What matters are the lower-
level facts-whatever they are. See supra Part III.A-C.
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matters for legal theory. Given this, the concept of the person cannot be
truly necessary for human rights. It is the lower-level facts of personhood
that are truly necessary.
As stated before, the Argument from Below can be countered with
the Argument from Above. For example, one might claim that it is the
official act of getting married that lends significance to the lower-level
facts of living together in a committed, romantic relationship. The offi-
cial act is important because it codifies the relationship publicly and the
lower-level facts of marriage derive their importance from above. Also,
one might argue that the lower facts of being a human being or a rational
agent are only important because they constitute being a person. But this
seems less plausible in both examples. 15 7 When pressed for answers
about the reasons for this importance, we eventually make reference to
the lower-level facts.
Of course, the Argument from Above and the Argument from Below
are not the only possible ways to parse the issue. A third interpretation is
offered in Part IV that finds a middle ground. This interpretation is de-
veloped by advancing Professor Felix Cohen's well-known critique of
"metaphysical" concepts in legal reasoningl 5 8
-as well as Professor Jer-
emy Waldron's response to it' 59-and then applying the resulting lessons
to our current analysis of personhood.
IV. THE EXPLANATORY CIRCLE OF THE CONCEPT OF THE PERSON
This Part points toward a solution by considering Professor Felix Co-
hen's famous criticism of metaphysical legal concepts 160 and applying it
to the concept of the person. It then harnesses Professor Jeremy Wal-
dron's response to Cohen that legal concepts must be viewed holistically;
Waldron suggests that Cohen's so-called "metaphysical concepts" often
play a key role in charting the logical consequences of our legal views and
rooting out inconsistencies within them. 16 1 While Waldron's response is
endorsed, an application of his standard to the concept of the person
suggests that the lower-level components achieve greater systematicity
than the upper-level concept. Finally, the analysis turns to the practical
157. This does not necessarily imply that we should do away with the concept of the
person and banish it from our pantheon of legal concepts. One might argue that since the
importance flows from the lower-level facts, eliminating the higher-level term is required.
But this is a stronger claim and it would require much stronger evidence. There might be
many reasons why a concept is useful, independent of the considerations discussed here.
For example, a concept might have rhetorical force in political contexts. The analysis
presented in this Note demonstrates simply that the concept of the person is performing
little of the argumentative work. For a fuller examination of this issue, see infra Part IV.C.
158. See generally Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functionalist
Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809 (1935).
159. See generally Jeremy Waldron, "Transcendental Nonsense" and System in the
Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 16 (2000).
160. Cohen, supra note 158, at 823.
161. Waldron, supra note 159, at 22.
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consequences for human rights discourse. Since some of the most con-
tentious arguments about human rights deal with cases where one or
more of these components are absent, legal arguments about human
rights should avoid taking a definition of personhood as a starting
point.162
A. Cohen's "Transcendental Nonsense"
Cohen's famous rejection of theoretical legal terminology provides
the perfect framework for judging the concept of the person and its defi-
ciencies, as identified in the previous two Parts of this Note. 163 Indeed,
Cohen even used corporate personhood as an example of the "supernat-
ural" ideas that plagued jurisprudence. 1 64 These concepts were "in-
fecting" legal theory because they could not be defined through experi-
ence.1 6 5 Cohen argued that these metaphysical concepts distract judges
from seeing that their decisions are based on social policy, economics,
and other extralegal considerations. More significantly, though, the met-
aphysical concepts hold the promise of what is inevitably an elusive possi-
bility: furnishing a useful explanation for judicial decisions.' 66
As argued in this Note, the concept of the person is an excellent
candidate for inclusion in Cohen's "special branch of the science of tran-
scendental nonsense"' 67 for the same reason announced by Cohen: The
metaphysical concept, despite appearances, furnishes no reasons for
adopting the conclusion of the argument. 168 In other words, it does little
of the argumentative work. To illustrate, Cohen parodies metaphysical
concepts by invoking Moliere: Opium makes you sleepy because it has a
dormitive principle. 169 This is absurd, of course, because it is precisely the
dormitive principle that we seek to explain. Inspired by Cohen, much of
the same objection could be deployed against the concept of the person:
It cannot serve as the foundation for human rights because it is personhood
itself that requires explanation. We seek a deeper understanding of what
it means to be a person and we cannot simply appeal to the principle of
personhood as a satisfactory response.
162. Others have reached similar conclusions. See Tom L. Beauchamp, The Failures
of Theories of Personhood, 9 Kennedy Inst. Ethics J. 309, 319 (1999) (reaching similar
conclusions but from different analysis than one presented here).
163. Cohen, supra note 158, at 823.
164. Id. at 813.
165. Id. at 823.
166. Id. at 842.
167. Id. at 821.
168. Id. at 847 (noting that Cohen's functional approach cleanses legal rules of
metaphysics and "permits ethics to come out of hiding").
169. Id. at 820.
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B. Waldron's Explanatory Circle
Cohen's analysis is subject to rebuttal-and it is important to under-
stand the strength of the rebuttal to properly diagnose our problems with
the concept of the person. In a powerful response to Cohen's frame-
work, Waldron notes that the problem with the "metaphysical" concepts
disparaged by Cohen is not their circularity-the problem is that the ex-
planation runs in a very tight circle.170 Given that we can only understand
legal concepts holistically, the issue of circularity per se is a canard. It is
the diameter of the explanatory circle that distinguishes the benignly cir-
cular from the viciously circular, according to Waldron.171 The diameter
of the explanatory circle in modern physics is extremely large, while the
"dormitive principle" of Molilre's opium belongs to a circle that is so
absurdly tight that it furnishes no explanation at all. 1 7 2
1. Waldron's Holism Applied to Persons. - While Waldron presents his
argument as a general rebuttal to Cohen's critique, one can see how it
applies to the concept of the person. Employing the Waldron rebuttal,
one might say that the concept of the person enforces systematicity in
legal reasoning, forcing us to recognize that a shift in one area of our
jurisprudence-say, declaring a corporation a person for purposes of
property rights-might have logical consequences for other areas of our
jurisprudence that are conceptually linked-say, making corporations
criminally or civilly responsible for their actions.1 73 The concept raises a
red flag, as it were, to alert us to possible areas of inconsistency or contra-
diction.174 It might be wrong to grant one right to an entity by deeming
it a person while at the same time denying its personhood in other areas
of the law, on pain of contradiction or hypocrisy. 175 The systematicity
imposed by the concept of the person prevents us from making these
purely local transformations to our jurisprudence at the expense of over-
all coherence.
2. The Lower-Level Concepts Achieve the Greatest Systematicity. - The
analysis presented in this Note departs in a significant fashion from Wal-
dron's general position. Whenever a series of concepts appears in an ex-
planatory circle, one has to make a decision about which concepts belong
in the circle. Only the right concepts will yield a circle wide enough to
produce real explanatory results. If a concept is too unwieldy it might
170. Waldron, supra note 159, at 50-51.
171. Id. at 21.
172. A dictionary is another classic example of an explanatory system that is not
viciously circular. Each word in the dictionary is defined relative to other words in the
dictionary, creating a system of meaning that can only be understood holistically. But the
dictionary's circularity is not vicious because the circle is large enough to yield real
explanations as to the meaning of words.
173. French, supra note 90, at 173-86.
174. Waldron, supra note 159, at 23.
175. Rovane makes a similar point when she concludes that persons "stand in a
certain distinctively interpersonal ethical relation to one another-one that they cannot
escape except through hypocritical prejudice." Rovane, supra note 74, at 73.
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achieve systematicity at the expense of giving precise answers. On the
other hand, achieving coherence in a conceptual system will only be pos-
sible if one chooses the concepts wisely.176 Any decision about concept
choice must weigh these two factors.
While the Waldron standard is correct, the evidence from Part I indi-
cates that the concept of the person does not meet his standard. The
concept falls victim to serious problems: It demands a synthesis of diverse
legal issues that should not be synthesized together. This results in an
imprecise concept that is too close for comfort to Moliere's dormitive
principle. A single umbrella houses such diverse ideas as biological
human beings, rational agency, and a psychological point of view on the
world. And these subconcepts do not necessarily converge. In fact, as the
examples provided in Part I make clear, human rights discourse becomes
most contentious in cases where the components diverge.
Still, systematic connections can and should be made among the
components of the concept of the person. 177 The biological concept of
the human being has obvious consequences for rational agency and the
biological nature of human beings may determine, in part, their psycho-
logical point of view on the world. 178 But these concepts are not necessa-
rily related in a single concept that has unified consequences across the
jurisprudential spectrum. Indeed, the survey of the field presented in
Part I of this Note suggests otherwise. Personhood is just as likely to
spread conceptual mischief across the legal spectrum as it is to provide
illuminating conceptual linkages. This should be no surprise. How can
the legal dilemmas over embryos, corporations, and patients with multi-
ple personalities all be solved with the same concept?
Dealing directly with the lower-level components will yield concrete
advantages for legal reasoning. First, it will become clear that there could
be more than one source for human rights; not all rights must flow from
the same conceptual spring.179 For example, biological human beings
and rational agents might have different rights. Individual human beings
and corporations need not be treated the same. Second, lawyers charged
176. For example, in the philosophy of science there are well-debated criteria for
which concepts should be used in scientific theories. See Ernest Nagel, The Structure of
Science 148 (1979) (discussing role of theoretical terms and concepts in experimental
science). There ought to be equally rigorous criteria when determining which concepts we
admit into our legal theory.
177. This point concedes some of the ground to Wiggins and other naturalists who
believe that the concept of the person must be organized around the biological notion and
that the components necessarily coincide. See Wiggins, supra note 25, at 194. However,
recognizing that there are systematic connections does not require going the full route
and enshrining an essential connection under the rubric of personhood. See supra notes
111-112 and accompanying text.
178. See generally Olson, supra note 112.
179. See Loren E. Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community 39-40 (1987)
(arguing that rights should be granted to beings who pursue rational projects and beings
who stand in a social relation to project pursuers). Lomasky calls this kind of moral theory
"multivalent." Id.
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with drafting human rights instruments must carefully decide which con-
cepts they select to ground each right asserted in the document. In gen-
eral, a concept should wear its theoretical significance on its sleeve.
When it comes time to apply the concept in legal arguments, the concept
should be transparent enough to reveal how it moves the argument for-
ward. Spurious arguments thrive in the absence of transparency.
C. Final Objections
There are two final objections to the position outlined in this Note-
one theoretical and the other practical. The first argues that conceptual
difficulties at the margins of a legal concept are no reason to revise or
eliminate it, especially if the concept does well in the majority of cases.
The second objection argues that elimination of the concept will deprive
human rights activism of its profound rhetorical force.
1. The Quarantine Objection. - According to the first objection, the
concept of the person performs remarkably well in almost every situation.
When walking down a street, the language of personhood is completely
adequate for picking out, and interacting with, the average passerby.
There are no problems in ninety-nine percent of the cases because all of
the components-rational agency, biological human beings, and unity of
consciousness-almost always coincide. The cases cited in Part I are truly
marginal. 180 Consequently, the concept's failure at the margins is no rea-
son to abandon, revise, or eliminate it from legal reasoning. Per-
sonhood's breakdown in difficult cases can be quarantined from the ma-
jority of successful cases, and only local modifications to the concept are
justified in those rare cases.
But this objection falsely assumes that the above analysis requires re-
moving the concept of the person from legal reasoning. One might have
thought that our previous analysis of personhood as a cluster concept
required its elimination from human rights discourse. While cluster con-
cepts are often ripe for elimination, their status as cluster concepts alone
does not demand such unequivocal action. It is tempting to conclude that
the structure of all cluster concepts is such that the higher-level concept
is not "real" and that the relative precision of the lower-level concepts
gives them a better claim for inclusion in our ontology. But this is a false
assumption. Use of the terms "higher" and "lower" should not be read to
mean that the "lower" concepts are somehow-by definition-more fun-
damental, more real, or ontologically prior. The relationship between
the higher and lower concepts in the cluster is more subtle. Personhood
brings together a cluster of related ideas that reside in close proximity in
legal reasoning. In many cases it might be wise to pursue legal reasoning
without the language of personhood and with the deeper components
instead. But the decision ought to be based on conceptual utility-i.e.,
180. See supra Part I.A-G.
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which concepts are nimble enough to facilitate systematicity in legal
thinking.
Nor does personhood's status as a cluster concept mean that our use
of the word in legal reasoning is nonsensical. Sometimes theorists label
an idea a "cluster concept" when they want to accuse it of outright inco-
herence. This leads to the semantic conclusion that uttering the phrase
"person" is literally meaningless because its sense cannot be ascertained.
This is a strong claim in the philosophy of language that, if borne out,
usually necessitates revision or elimination of the concept. But this Note
does not advance that claim. Instead, this Note has suggested that per-
sonhood brings together a diverse group of subordinate concepts that
coincide in daily life but diverge in controversial legal cases. As a conse-
quence, it cannot serve as the foundation for a human rights claim. But
the word is not meaningless.
2. The Rhetorical Force of Personhood. - The concept of the person has
another advantage for legal reasoning that cautions against abandoning it
too quickly. Groups demanding human rights have not only used the
concept of the person to achieve remarkable change, they may consider
the concept essential to that rhetoric. Arguably, depriving human rights
activists of the rhetorical force of the concept will hamper their ability to
argue for progressive political reform. Simply put, the concept of the
person retains a certain intuitive force not captured by other concepts at
our disposal. So even if our use of the concept lacks logical clarity, it
makes up for it with rhetorical appeal.
However, nothing in this argument requires that we eliminate per-
sonhood and describe legal reality in strictly nonperson terms. In fact,
human rights activists can still make their claims on behalf of persons.
This Note simply suggests that theorists should be more aware of the real
motivating force behind their arguments, so that they offer real reasons
for their legal conclusions, as opposed to resorting to question-begging
terminology. Furthermore, we can revise our legal reasoning in a way
that does not impact the human rights theorist. It makes little sense to
develop a full-blown account of personhood first and then track its impli-
cations for human rights. Theorists can look to the lower-level facts and
debate their legal relevance directly. However, once they complete this
legal reasoning, nothing suggests that activists cannot press their claims
in the political arena armed with the rhetorical force of the concept of
the person.
CONCLUSION
This Note argues that the concept of the person, while seemingly at
the center of human rights discourse, performs little of the heavy theoret-
ical work. In addition to cataloguing the wide range of arguments that
appeal to personhood, this Note analyzes the performance of the concept
in specific human rights arguments. The analysis yields the following in-
sight: Personhood is a placeholder for deeper concepts that ground our
[Vol. 105:209
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moral intuitions about human rights. Consequently, human rights argu-
ments are obscured by their reliance on the concept of the person.
But we need not completely banish the concept from legal reason-
ing. Rather, this Note seeks to replace one set of questions about persons
and personhood (and their implications for human rights) with a new set
of questions about biological human beings, consciousness, and rational
agency. Although the vocabulary of personhood is deeply entrenched in
legal reasoning, this Note demonstrates that applied legal reasoning must
be more sensitive to its reliance on the deeper elements of personhood. Un-
derstanding the role played by the deeper components-and conse-
quently embracing the new questions-will increase the conceptual clar-
ity of human rights discourse.
